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Abstract 
In the Turkish Republic, especially in the 1960s and 1970s Foreign Investment 
was regarded as a very suspicious subject as a result of the capitulations and a 
substantial amount of Ottoman Debt. There were many debates about the issue in the 
press and in public and most of the stuIes in h s  period had generally a normative 
way of looking at the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) issue. 
Although Law 6224, the encouragement of Forelgn Investment, which was 
designed as a liberal law, was enacted in 1954, it was used as a law Iscouragmg forelgn 
investment due to this suspicious attitude. During this period a very small amount of 
FDI entered into Turkey and its share was very insipficant in the Turhsh economy. 
When we compare the amount of FDI corning to Turkey with the 
corresponding amounts in some other developing countries we clearly see that our 
findings strengthens that the share of FDI in Turkey is insignificant. These countries 
enjoyed an inflow of FDI averaging one-three bdhon dollars per year while Turkey 
received averapg eight-ten million dollars per year in this period. 
This thesis studies the FDI in Turkey between 1950 and 1980 and examines the 
contribution of the FDI to the economic growth, employment and tax revenues. In 
addition, it aims to ascertain the obstacles and impediments that obstruct the greater 
flow of private foreign investment into Turkey. 
Ozet 
O s m a d  lmparatorlu@'ndan miras kalan kapitiilasyonlar ve dlg borqlar, 
Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde, ozellikle 1960 ve 1970'li ydarda yabancl sermayeye kargi 
gupheci bir yaklagrmrn do&nasma neden olmugtur. 
1954 y h d a  yiiriirluge giren 6224 sayh yabanci sermayeyi tegvik kanunu 
oldukqa liberal hukiunler tagmasma rawen  bu gupheci yaklagrmrn sonucunda, yabancl 
sermayenin geligini engelleyici bir biqimde kullanrlrmgm. Bu donemde Tiirkiye'ye gelen 
yabancl sermaye oldukqa duguk miktardadu ve ekonomiye kathsi onemsiz denebilecek 
boyuttadu. 
Turkiye'yi diger bazi geligmekte olan iilkelerle kargdagmdl@z zaman 
Tiirhye'ye gelen yabanci sermaye miktanntn ne derece onemsiz boyutta oldu@ daha iyi 
goriilmektedir. Bu ulkeler ydda ortalama bir-uq milyar dolarhk yabancl sermaye 
qekerken, aym donemde, Tiirkiye'ye ydda ortalama sekiz-on d y o n  dolarhk yabanci 
sermaye girigi olmugtur. 
Bu tez 1950 ve 1980 arasi Turhye'de dogmdan yabanci sermaye yaanmlam 
qahgmakta ve yabanc~ sermayenin ekonomik buyiimeye, istihdama ve iilkenin vergi 
gelirlerine olan etkisini incelemektedir. Cahgma, aym zamanda yetersiz yabancl sermaye 
giriginin nedenleri uzerinde de durrnaktadu. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is written with a purpose to evaluate the activities of foreign firms 
in Turkey. Foreign Direct Investment, generally, is regarded as a very suspicious 
subject in Turkey. In addition, most of the stuches and discussions in the 1970s were 
lack of an objective, empirical analysis of foreign direct investment. Therefore to study 
the activities of foreign firms and to examine their contribution to Turkish economy 
becomes interesting. However, it should be mentioned that there is not any reliable 
statistical material about FDI in Turkey. The empirical findings of many economists 
differ from each other. Therefore, all of the statistical data are analyzed to reach a 
proper conclusion. 
Thls thesis has seven chapters. The &st and the second chapters offer a survey 
of foreign drrect investment theories. The concept of foreign investment and the 
economic and business theories of foreign &ect investment are examined. In this way, 
the question of why firms invest abroad is examined. 
Chapter 3 deals with the economic growth ddernma of developing countries 
and examines the theories that deal with the necessity of foreign direct investment to 
realize economic growth in these countries. In addition, the theories that criticize the 
models that gve  priority to foreign direct investment to realize economic growth in 
developing countries will be examined. 
In Chapter 4, international FDI activities are examined to understand whether 
there is a direct relationship between FDI activities and the international economic 
conjuncture or not. Also, the tendency of FDI movements is analyzed by examining 
the FDI stock shares of the countries in the world. 
Chapter 5 describes the foreign du-ect investment activities in Turkey with 
respect to the historical context. The political economy of FDI in Turkey examined. 
The Turkish foreign investment encouragement laws are summarized. 
In Chapter 6, some data such as the amounts and the ratios of authorized and 
reahzed FDI, the dstribution of FDI in Turkey among Qfferent countries, the 
contribution of FDI to economic growth, employment, and tax revenues are calculated 
and presented in tables. 
Chapter 6 also deals with the problem of inadequate flow of FDI into Turkey 
from a comparative perspective. Although this thesis puts forward the contribution of 
foreign direct investment to the Turkish economy by quantitive studes, it cannot 
elucidate the reasons for the inadequate inflow of FDI by using the same methods. In 
order to compensate for this, data obtained from the questionnaires and personal 
interviews were used to evaluate the Turhsh foreign investment clunate. 
In addition, the role of bureaucracy, economic climate, attitudes of the 
governments to the foreign hrms will be examined to understand the reasons for the 
inadequate inflow of FDI. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Concepts 
Portfolio investment is referred to as short-term capital flow and to the 
exchange of a financial asset of a foreign country in the international capital markets. 
In this way, capital flows from one country to another and differs from foreign direct 
investment in that it can take place in a variety of forms, such as through stocks and 
bonds, short-term credit forms. F o r e p  direct investment is referred to as long-term 
capital flow and differs from portfolio investment by taking place in kind, through the 
exchange of property (patents, technology or machinery) and by acquiring control of a 
company. It also differs from other kinds of international capital movements in that 
drrect investment proceeds by the reinvestment of profits and accompanied by varying 
degrees of control, plus technology and management.' 
In brief FDI is an operation realized by the firms of one country by owning a 
firm, constituting a new firm, or enlarging the f m ' s  capital in another country. In 
addition, management skills, control authority and technology accompany drrect 
investment activities, and investors can transfer money, machinery or patent rights as 
direct in~estment.~ 
I Charles Kindleberger, American Investment Abroad (New Haven: Yale University Press 1969), 
p.2. 
Jack N. Behrman, "Promoting Free World Economic Development through Direct Investment", 
American Economic Review (May 1960), pp. 270-282. 
The Origins of the Political Economy of International Trade and FDI 
In the nineteenth century, the free trade theories generated by Adam Smith and 
David hcardo3 explained and supported the increasing volume of international trade 
activities. However, there was no systematic explanation of firms investing abroad. 
Thls could be due to the growing importance of portfolio investments rather than 
direct investments or to economists paying attention to international trade theories as a 
result of the significant increase in volume of international trade. According to free 
trade theory, voluntary trade between two countries by concentrating on producing 
goods with which they have the comparative advantage - absolutely more comparative 
in a specific product - is the best known proposition in the theory of international 
trade. Thls theory is inadequate in general not only because of its inadequacy to 
explain foreign investment activities, but also it doesn't sound convincing to 
policymakers in most countries - developed and developing - and to some 
 economist^.^ 
As foreign investment by European firms in the late nineteenth century grew, 
political economists started to invesagate the nature of foreign investment. One of the 
theoretical studies took place in Lenin's writings5 Lenin largely focused on the 
working of capitalism, and foreign investment was a distinctive feature of the "last 
stage of capitalism". However, His main concern was the functioning and the future of 
capitalism rather than generating a theory of FDI. Like most of the early political 
economists who were his contemporaries, he also preferred historical methods as the 
See David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: G Bell and sons, 
1932); Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Collier, 1902). 
4 T.N. Srinivasan, Handbook of Development Economics, v. 2 ed, H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, 
Amsterdam: North Holland 1989 p. 1 14 1. 
5 V. I Lenin, Imperialism: The ~ i g h e s t  Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 
1977). 
mode of analysis. Accordmg to him, FDI activities were a part of and the last stage of 
the international capitalist system and as the profit ratio in developed countries started 
to decrease because of the demand for increasing standards of living capital then was 
exported abroad to the less developed periphery countries. In these countries profits 
were usually hlgh, for capital was scarce, the price of land and wages were low, and raw 
materials were cheap.6 In the following chapters of h s  book, Lenin points out the 
relationship between monopoly as a transition from capitalism to a higher system and 
exporting capital abroad.' This view was later developed by political economists to 
explain the nature of Multinational Corporations (MNC). 
The early writings of political economists about FDI were multidrsciphary 
analyses. They analyzed the subjects with concepts belonging to the fields of 
economics, sociology, and history, and their methodology was generally qualitative. 
The early political economists studying foreign investment differed from the 
economists in the 1970s in that the latter elaborated theories and models including 
testing results, statistical analysis and comparative case studies. 
Until the 1960s, except for a few works by political economist works, there 
was no systematic model of or theory on FDI activities. Actually, foreign investment 
was recognized as a part of intemational trade activities, and generally explained by 
trade theories. One of the contemporary intemational trade theories was the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade. According to this model, trade between two 
countries takes place not because of the differential labor productivity that arises from 
technological difference as Ricardo argues, but because of the differences in factor 
endowments among countries with the assumptions that all countries have access to 
the same technology, constant returns to scale in production, and pure competition in 
Ibid., p.63. 
' Ibid., p.88. 
the international and national markets. Model implies that Ricardo exposed labor-value 
theory as the unit of analysis, although he did not explain the reasons for the 
differences of production costs in countries. The theory states that a trade takes place 
between two countries that have drfferent factor endowments, capital intensive or 
labor intensive. However, as will be discussed below, later on, the emergence of FDI 
theories implying the imperfect market approach became a threat to Heckscher- 
Ohlin's theory. 
As the FDI activities began to increase sipficantly after 1950, the need of 
an FDI theory emerged in the intellectual community in the 1960s. T h s  is strongly 
related with the new international economic conjuncture emerged after the end of 
Second World War. After the War, as the peace was maintained the volume of 
international trade increased rapidly. Between 1945 and 1950 capital stock in the U.S. 
reached a significant level and U.S. industry had not been subjected to any damages 
during the war years. In addition, during the war U.S. industry had overcome the 
problems of unemployment and demand shortage that the economic depression had 
created in the 1930s, reaching full employment. At the end of the war, as the peace was 
maintained, U.S. industry rearranged its production techniques in response and excess 
capital began to flow abroad. 
Although many economists were aware of the capital flowing abroad owing 
to the condrtions created by the Second World War, there was no systematic analysis 
of FDI and Multinational Corporations (MNC) until the 1960s. However, between 
1945 and 1960 subjects related to foreign investment were discussed generally in the 
works of development economists. T h s  was strongly related with the necessity of 
external sources in late developing countries in order to realize higher economic 
growth rates. After the Second World War, as most of the colonies and semi-colonies 
became independent nation-states, a strong demand emerged by the governors of 
independent countries to experience rapid growth rates and economic development; 
also, at that time the western and eastern blocks were competing to integrate late 
developing countries (LDC) into their economic systems. Therefore, to understand 
why these countries were unable to realize industrialization and to make suggestions to 
help them, development economics emerged as a branch of economics and 
development economist mentioned the importance of FDI in the development 
process of LDCs. 
At that moment, the world was hvided economically and politically into a 
two-poled system. In western developed countries, Keynesian economic policies 
including government intervention were put into practice to aclueve sustained 
economic growth and the welfare state was the main objective. However, for the 
proper functioning of the international economic order and to realize sustained 
growth, it became necessary to devise an institutional framework whlch promoted 
growth of trade, assisted in the reconstruction of European countries and helped in the 
economic development of the LDCs. For this purpose the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the International Trade Organization (ITO) and the International Bank 
of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) were established after the Bretton Woods 
conference in 1944. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), taking 
ITO's place, was first signed in 1947 and it aimed to sustain liberal trading. After the 
establishment of these institutions, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) was established in the sixties to facilitate trade issues in the 
context of development. 
The establishment of these institutions led to a significant increase in 
international trade activities. Regulating the rules of international economic relations 
and maintaining a strong international currency sustained the proper functioning of the 
international economic activities. Assisting the European countries and, later on 
developing countries, led to an increase in the GNP of these countries, which also 
meant an increase in demand for U.S. goods. Parallel to the growth of international 
trade, foreign investment, especially foreign direct investment, activities increased 
sigmficantly. FDI reached such important high levels that scholars began to examine 
and sought to formulate a general theory of FDI activities. 
In sum, prior to 1960, there was no unique theory of the determinants of 
FDI. Generally, in the earlier stuhes done by political economists, the central issue had 
been the functioning of capitalism and the maintenance of international trade activities. 
These studles did not look at the incentives or general tendency of FDI activities. 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES EXPLAINING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Economic Theories Explaining FDI 
After 1960 economists began to study the FDI phenomenon. The motives of 
firms investing abroad, licensing their advantages instead of having a foreign operation, 
came under examination. Stephen Herbert Hymer made the first theoretical approach. 
In his doctorate thesis, which he wrote at M.I.T., microeconomic analysis was 
introduced into the study of FDI. According to Hymer, MNCs were the product of 
imperfect competition and should be analyzed with models from the field of industrial 
organization. He also put forward the reasons for the necessity of the ownership of 
subsidies for MNCs rather than giving a license to a local firm. 
Hymer's most popular argument, which has been used many times by other 
economists, such as Kindleberger, was the frrm advantage argument. Hymer implies 
that the unequal ability of firms is a sufficient condition for foreign investment. If a 
foreign company prefers to invest abroad it should have specific advantages over the 
native companies because, national companies have the general advantage of better 
information about their country, in areas such as the economy, language, and law.8 
Second, Hymer discusses the importance of market conditions. According to him, if 
markets were imperfect, profits would be increased as a result of collusion. For 
instance, if a merger occurs, competition between the two units is elimated, and total 
8 Stephen Hymer, The Theory of International Operations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1976), p. 
34. 
profits are increa~ed.~ 1f entry into markets is difficult, and there are only a few 
companies, the profit ratio and the attractiveness of entry wdl be increased for the 
foreign company because of the hlgh profit rate. If entry into a market is not difficult, 
there is not much point in trying to control the market as the entry of other firms 
would begin to decrease profit. When there are more than a few firms, cooperation 
becomes more difficult.'" Especially, the imperfect market structure is a reason for 
intemational operations where raw materials are involved and diversification is also a 
motivation for intemational operations. 
As mentioned before, generally, firms intending to invest abroad should have 
advantages in a certain industry. There are many kinds of advantages in malung and 
selling a product such as producing at a lower cost than other firms, having greater 
knowledge, or having better dstribution services. On the other hand a firm would 
choose to license, rent or sell its advantage as a type of FDI instead of having a foreign 
operation. 
Then the question is how a firm licenses the advantage instead of using it 
itself or vice versa. According to Hymer, the market structure determines the answer. 
If the markets are free - meaning each f m ' s  behavior affects the other firms - joint 
maximization may not occur, and then, it is better for a foreign firm to license its 
advantages. Therefore, when markets are free or close to perfect competition, firms 
prefer to license their advantages rather than having foreign operations and also prefer 
to have foreign operations where markets are imperfect. According to Kindleberger 
the nature of monopolistic advantages, whlch produce duect investment, can be 
indcated under a variety of headings such as departures from perfect competition in 
goods markets, including product differentiation in branded products such as 
Ibid., p.37. 
'O Ibid., p.38. 
cosmetics and soft drinks; in concentrated industries, such as automobiles, tires, 
chemicals, electronic components, special marketing skills; departures from perfect 
competition in factor markets (including the existence of patented or unavailable 
technology); and internal and external economies of scale and government limitations 
on output or entry." 
Hymer states that there are two important reasons for having a foreign 
operation under conditions of a monopoly or oligopoly. First, the firm will be selling 
its advantage to enterprises whch possesses monopoly power in their markets. A 
sequential monopoly is therefore involved. The second problem of licensing arises 
from the difficulty of cont rohg prices and output. However, if the firm undertakes 
the operation itself instead of licensing its advantages, there would be less d~fficulty in 
achieving maximum profits. Therefore, under the conditions monopoly or oligopoly, it 
would be better for a fLrm to have foreign operation instead of licensing it. If there 
were many buyers of the advantage it would be better to license advantages. The 
existence of other firms with similar advantages in other countries leads foreign firms 
to seek this approach. This is because foreign firms, under such conditions, may not 
want to compete with other firms, and prefer to form cooperation by licensing its 
advantages. 
The table below shows the composition of FDI between licensing and 
having a foreign operation. 
" Kindleberger, pp. 13-27 
Table 1 ~ i c e n s e ' ~  Receipts of U.S. Firms by Region in 1956 (millions of dollars) 
License Receipts of US Companies from Foreigners 
Unaffiliated Companies ~f f i l ia tes '~  of U.S. Companies 
Canada 15.7 
Latin America 10.4 
Continental Europe 50.3 
United Kingdom 28.6 
Australia 5.1 
Firms and Earnings on Direct Investments by Area and Country in 1956", pp.56-59. 
What  this table suggests is that the share o f  American companies in 
European industry, i n  general, is less than those i n  Canadian o r  Latin American 
industries. I n  Latin American and  Canada, receipts from unaffhated companies are 
hgh, as compared t o  affiliated companies. This is because the ratio o f  FDI in  Canada 
and  Latin America is high and native companies do not  provide efficiency t o  compete 
with foreign companies. O n  the other hand, there is a strong domestic competition for 
American companies in Europe and Britain. Therefore, U.S. companies prefer t o  
license their advantages rather than operating in European industry. I n  Table 1, 
Australia is an  exception in the pattern o f  licensing and direct investment mentioned 
above. I n  Australia, the receipts from unaffiliated countries are relatively high, bu t  
there is n o  sufficient explanation for this anomaly. 
I n  sum, the market imperfection approach explains the direction o f  FDI. 
According t o  this approach, firms generally choose t o  have a foreign operation when 
there is an oligopoly and monopoly conditions. There are two important facts 
determining the type of  FDI. By bilateral monopoly, the profit ratio of  foreign firm 
12 
"Receipts" refer not only to licensing but all receipts in connection with agreements to supply 
patents, processes, technology, equipment under rental, and other technical and proprietary assets 
such as copyrights and trademarks. 
13 
"Affiliates" refers to foreign branches and subsidiaries. The receipts from affiliates do not include 
receipts paid by foreigners to these foreign branches but remitted in the form of profits or dividends 
to the parent firm. 
increases. Therefore under imperfect market conditions, for a foreign firm, to have a 
foreign operation rather than licensing is attractive. Also under such conditions, 
foreign firms do not have the ability to control cost and selling prices if it licenses its 
advantages to the local h s .  Hence, again, having a foreign operation becomes more 
attractive. On the other hand, if there are many firms operating under free markets 
conditions, it becomes attractive to a firm to license its advantages rather than having a 
foreign operation. Although the firm would enter into the domestic market with a 
technological advantage would face strong competition from the domestic firms under 
perfect competition (or close to) condition. Empirical data suggest that market 
conditions determine the type of foreign direct investment. As shown above, 
American firms mostly choose to have foreign operations in Canada and Latin 
America; in contrast, they commonly license their advantages in Europe and Britain. 
Differentiation of products, technology advantage, and management s U s  create 
advantages in the oligopoly and encourage the companies to invest abroad. However 
the market imperfection theory does not satisfactorily explain the inadequate flow into 
LDCs, even though, market imperfections are more familiar in these countries. Direct 
investments mostly flow between developed countries. 
One of the leading studies on FDI is Raymond Vernon's work on product 
cycles in trade and investment. Vernon's work had two important consequences. First 
he tried to find out the reason for commodity exporting countries becoming the 
importers of these goods in a specific time period. By doing this he tried to determine 
the pattern of international trade. Second, he examined the role of FDI in the model. 
Vernon argues that new products and processes are first exported from the 
countries in which they are invented, however, foreign countries produce them later, 
first for domestic consumption, and then for export. He also emphasizes the 
assumption that the enterprises in any one of the advanced countries has access to 
scientific knowledge and their capacity to comprehend scientific principles does not 
mean equal probability of the application of these principals in the generation of new 
products.14 Innovation takes place in countries with high average incomes and with 
high unit labor costs and unrationed capital compared with all other countries. There 
are three stages of product development: new product, maturing product and 
standardized product. A firm in a country of high average income realizes new 
products. The cost ratio is high, the income elasticity of demand is high, and the 
amount of product is insufficient for exporting. 15 
In the maturing product process, if the product has a high-income elasticity 
of demand or if it is a satisfactory substitute for high-cost labor, the demand in time 
will begin to grow quite rapidly in relatively advanced countries.16 As the technological 
knowledge spreads out of the innovator firm, other firms began to produce the same 
product, yet the innovator firm retains its technological advantage and exports the 
product to other countries. In the standardized product process the country in which 
the innovation was realized becomes exporter of that product in a specific period of 
time. As a result of the spread of technological knowledge, the countries called second 
- third movers begin to produce the product more efficiently. In less developed 
countries, due to the low cost of labor, the price of the product become cheaper than 
in the advanced countries. 
This aspect explanation of trade activity is different from the Heckscher - 
O h h  theory of international trade. The Heckscher - Ohlin theory argues that the 
exports of the less developed countries would tend to be relatively labor-intensive 
14 Raymond Vernon, "International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (May, 1966), p. 191. 
I S  Ibid., p. 192. 
l6  Ibid., p.197. 
products. Yet Vernon argues that as knowledge is regarded as a free good, then 
products formerly innovated in advanced countries will not pose the problem of 
market information for less developed countries and the investment of such products 
in less developed countries becomes attractive as a result of the low cost of labor. 
The product cycle theory also explains the incentives of FDI as well as the 
pattern of international trade. According to Vernon, in the first development stage of 
the product, the firms in advanced countries (in which average income and labor costs 
are htgh) spend more than their foreign counterparts on new product development. In 
the early stages of the introduction of a new product, firms generally meet with a 
number of problems. For instance, the innovator firm does not have the capacity to 
produce in the new product in large amounts at low cost levels. Therefore, in the first 
process, the innovator firm has the advantage over its local counterparts and does not 
intend to have a foreign operation due to number of problems with whtch it meets. In 
the maturing product process, as the demand for the product expands, a certain degree 
of standardnation takes place. As the income elasticity of demand for the product is 
high, the demand will begin to grow in other advanced countries. During this process, 
the innovator firm exports its product to other relatively advanced and other late 
developing countries. 
Then the question is when a firm chooses to invest abroad rather than 
export the product. For Vernon, the decision of investment abroad takes place as long 
as the margmal production cost plus the txansport cost of the product exported are 
hgher than the average cost of the production of the product in a foreign market." 
The producers do not want to lose their share of the marketplace in foreign markets, 
and inevitably they invest abroad. As the product becomes standardized, second and 
17 Ibid., pp. 196- 197. 
thud movers -late developing countries- become attractive as the production locations 
for the investors. In his study, Vernon also examines how late developing countries 
became exporters of certain products which were imported before. However, there is 
an assumption that a scarcity of capital and labor-intensive production takes place in 
these countries. Then the question is how these countries become exporters of such 
products with a scarcity of capital. Vernon implies that scarcity of capital in the less 
developed countries does not prevent facilities for the production of standardize 
 product^.'^ First, foreign investment takes place in industries which require some 
significant labor inputs in the production process, yet they are concentrated in those 
sub-sectors of the industry which produce highly standardized products capable of 
self-contained production establishments. Second, the subject that capital costs may 
not prove a barrier to investment in the standardized product is complex. One of the 
features of h s  complexity is the role played by the international investor. For instance: 
producers of chemical fertilizers, when considering whether to invest in a given 
country, may be less concerned with the going rate for capital in that country than with 
their opportunity costs as they see such costs." 
Vernon sees great importance in U.S. firms having a technological advantage 
and explores the relationship between FDI and product cycle. His work integrates 
trade and foreign du-ect investment as different stages of the product cycle. What 
makes Vernon's theory different from Heckscher - Ohlin theory is that in the 
Heckscher - Ohlm's theory of trade, the same variables are used to explain both trade 
and non-trade activities. Vernon emphasizes that the starting point of FDI is the 
innovation advantages of firms in a certain country. Trade flows reflect patterns of 
innovation, which are driven by internal conditions. New products are first exported 
l8 Ibid., pp.205-206. 
l9  Ibid., p.206. 
from the advanced country, whlch has a high average income and high labor cost level. 
Later, foreign countries begin to produce the product, first for domestic demand and 
later for export. Finally, the country in which the innovation was reahzed becomes 
importer of that product. 
In sum, FDI in this model takes place when the marginal production cost 
plus the transport cost of the product exported is hlgher than the average cost of the 
production of the product in a foreign market. With FDI, technologies are transferred 
across borders from the innovating country to second and third movers. However, 
changing conditions have led scholars to question the product cycle model. Even so, 
the model, by analyzing the relationship between trade, FDI, and technology, has 
remained important for many years. 
In the 1970s and 1980s studies on MNCs were divided into two branches, 
both of which find their roots in the studies of Stephen Hymer and Raymond Vernon. 
The first group, using the tools of institutional economics, such as transaction costs, 
explained the existence and development of MNCs. The second group, using 
concepts from industrial organization, such as market power, explained the existence 
and behavior of MNCs. The transaction cost approach, one of the important 
approaches explaining FDI, emerged in the 1970s in order to explain the motives of 
FDI. 
The transaction approach, argues that the transaction cost theory can explain 
the reasons for the existence and development of MNCs. Market imperfections are 
natural characteristics of markets, and MNCs are institutions for avoiding these 
imperfections.2" However, the neoclassical school assumes economic agents have 
*' Jean-Franqois Hennart, "The Transaction Cost Theory of the Multinational Enterprise", in 
Christos N. Pitelis and Roger Sugden (eds), The Nature of the Transnational Firm (London: 
Routledge, 199 l), p.82. 
perfect knowledge and therefore the price system become the dominant organization 
in markets and market transaction costs are zero. As the price mechanism constitutes 
an information system, each economic agent would consider the needs of society. 
However, in practice, markets are not as well organized as the neoclassical theory 
assumes. Therefore, market transaction costs, which include information, and 
bargaining costs are positive. Market imperfection creates difficulties in evaluating the 
real values of goods and services; therefore prices in the markets provide imperfect 
signals for the economic agents. 
In the first half of the 1980s new studies on FDI challenged the idea of 
creating a general theory of FDI. Before the 1980s the main aim of scholars was to 
generate a universal theory of FDI. However, Kiyoshi Kojima suggested that U.S. and 
to some extent European MNCs are substantially different from Japanese MNCs. 
Kojima asserted that there is a "Japanese Style" FDI that contrasts sharply with "MNC 
Style" or "U.S. Style" FDI. "Japanese Style FDI" Iffers from "U.S. style FDI" in that 
Japanese MNCs tend to promote exports from host countries and to support local 
industries. However, "U.S. Style" MNCs tend to be anti-trade, and exploit 
monopolistic advantages overseas. 
According to Kojima, the world's direct investment activities expand only 
among developed nations, as the MNCs of developed nations are engaged in 
expanding the intrafm division of labor with regard to Ifferentiated, hlgh technology 
products. On the other hand, drrect investment flow from developed to developing 
nations at a slackened pace, although it is vital in creating impetus to economic 
development. In these countries technologically simple, labor-intensive industries can 
be managed by developing nations themselves, therefore new forms of FDI are 
demanded. Furthermore, MNCs, at this moment, find fewer profitable investment 
opportunities in these c~untries.~' 
Kojirna states that this may be the case with European and American MNCs, 
yet, unlike other developed nations, as a latecomer to the field of FDI, Japan has 
directed its foreign investment overwhelrmngly toward developing nations and 
Japanese MNCs therefore can be crucially important for promoting economic 
development in those regons." 
As Hymer points out in his study, a typical FDI in a manufacturing industry 
advances its monopolistic advantage and attempts to achieve monopolistic gains by 
dominating the host country's domestic market. As Dunning states, MNCs attempt to 
internalize their transactions through networks of subsidiaries, aiming to reduce 
transaction costs and maximize profits.23 However, Japan begins its FDI first in 
industries in which Japan is already at a comparative dtsadvantage or, in other words, 
in industries in whch the host country has comparative advantages. U.S. MNCs tend 
to invest overseas in the most advanced industries in which it has comparative 
advantages. In ths  type, FDI replaces export and FDI is called antitrade-oriented. 
Kojima argues that Japanese FDI is complementary to tradez4. 
To illustrate the contribution of Japanese FDI to the international trade 
activities of a developing country, Kojima gves an example of the Japanese style of 
investment. Japan completely lacks raw materials such as petroleum. Therefore it is at a 
comparative disadvantage. On the other hand, Indonesia is rich in deposits although, 
- -- 
2 1 Kiyoshi Kojima, "Japanese-Style Direct Foreign Investment", in Japanese Economic Studies 
(Spring, 1986), p.55. 
22 Ibid., pp.55-56. 
23 John H. Dunning "Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the MNE: A Search for an Eclectic 
Approach", in B. Ohlin, ed., The International Allocation of Economic Activity (London: Holmes 
and Meier 1977), pp.395-4 18. 
24 Kiyoshi Kojima, Direct Foreign Investment A Japanese Model of Multinational Business 
Operations London: Croom Helm, 1978 p.65. 
they remained underdeveloped and cannot be traded at all. Only when Japan or the 
United States gives du-ect investment in developing them would Indonesia achieve a 
comparative advantage in the extraction of petroleum, creating new trade at the same 
time. Japan at first invested in the development of natural resources, such as fuel and 
other products, which it wished to import. For Icojirna, ths  development-import has 
meant investment with the objective of complementing the Japanese comparative 
disadvantage and it is typical of Japanese-style FDI.'~ 
The other example he gives deals with labor-intensive industries such as 
textiles. As the Japanese economy developed further, its pool of labor become 
relatively inadequate. Labor-intensive industries became more costly as a result of 
substantial increases in ~ a ~ e s . ~ " a ~ a n  the  turned, for example, to Korea, where the 
wages were one-third of those of Japan. Korea, where labor was more plentiful and 
wages relatively low, had a potential comparative advantage in such labor-intensive 
production but was unable to realize that potential without direct foreign investment. 
The arrival of Japan MNCs to create joint ventures for the manufacture of textiles 
combining Korean labor with Japan capital and technology is beneficial both for the 
export activities and economic development of ~orea . "  
In sum, Japanese-style promotes the balanced and orderly industrialization of 
the receiving developing nations. In contrast U.S.-style FDI mostly concentrates on 
those sectors in whch they have a comparative advantage. U.S. MNCs enjoy high 
profit ratios in protected, oligopolistic markets and produce goods for the domestic 
market rather than export-oriented commodities in developing countries. However, 
Japanese-style FDI generally contributes to the trade activities of these countries. 
25 Kojima, "Japanese-Style Direct Foreign Investment", p.70. 
26 Ibid., p.77. 
'' Ibid., p.7 1 .  
As it is considered for h s  study, the Japanese-style of FDI strengthens the 
hypothesis that although there are many case studies, there is not a general FDI theory 
explaining the motives of all MNCs in the world. 
In the 1990s most of the studtes of FDI rely on the theories generated in the 
mid 1970s and early 1980s. Most of the economic models of the 1970s and 1980s are 
broadly relevant explaining most of FDI activities. As Dunning points out, the studtes 
of J.C. McManus, Mark Casson and Peter Buckley, Alan Rugman, Birgitta 
Swedenborg and Jean Francois Hennart to put forward a general or core theory of 
international business remain a rich and powerful framework for analysis in the 
1990sZ8. In addition he points out that the internalization paradigm whch seeks to 
offer a general, rather than a partial, analytic framework for understanding the growth 
and pattern of international production, and the eclectic paradigm that not only 
concerns with the incentives of foreign operation but also seeks to identify and 
evaluate the advantages whch enable the investing firms to out compete their foreign 
rivals in the first place, continue to offer a rich framework for analyzing the economic 
determinants of the cross border business activities of both firms and countries. In 
other words, by Dunning's own words, "we believe that is only by embracing the 
concepts of alliance capitalism and the realization that the competitiveness of f m s  is 
becoming increasingly dependent on their abhty to harness the competitive advantages 
of other f m s  and also the location specific created assets of other countries that the 
economic paradigms of the 1970s and 1980s can retain their explanatory power in the 
1990s."~' 
28 John H. Dunning, "The Economic Theory of the Firms as the Basis for a 'Core' Theory of 
International Production" in Current Issues in International Business ed. Iyanatul Islam and William 
Shepherd (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing) 1997. 
29 Dunning, p.64. 
However, Dunning also underhes, "The emphasis of competitive 
advantages of firms and those of countries, and the ways in which firms organize the 
use of the two kinds of assets, is changing as the socio-institutional structure of 
capitalism is shifting from that primarily based on herarches and markets to that 
based on a more pluralistic combination of hierarchies, inter-firm alhances, networks 
and markets, not to mention the role of governments. Increasingly, any 'core' theory of 
international business needs to incorporate the consequences which cross-border 
Inter-firm Corporation has on the resources and capabhties of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) and the ways in whch MNEs choose to organize these assets ."'" 
As the increasing extent of FDI, the technologcal complexity of many products, the 
changing needs of consumers and the increasing geographcal dispersion of 
knowledge-intensive assets are considered; it is probable that new theories and models 
of FDI will contribute to the field. For instance, "a fourth category was added to the 
motives of the market, resource and efficiency seeking FDI, named strategc asset- 
seeking FDI, which it was argued was undertaken to add to the acquiring firm's 
existing portfolio of assets others which they have perceive will either sustain or 
strengthen their overall competitive position, or weaken that of their 
30 Ibid., p. 66. 
3 1 John H. Dunning Globalization and the Theory of MNE Activity in The Globalization of 
Multinational Enterprise Activitiy and Economic Development ed. Neil Hood and Stephen Young 
(New York: St Martin's Pres), 2000. p.28. 
Business Theories of Direct Investment 
According to neo-classical economic theory, the motive of a firm behavior is 
explained by profit maximization. Therefore, profit ratio is the primary criteria for a 
firm while decidmg on investment activity. In addition, as Hymer mentions, the profit 
ratio in the host country should be higher than that in the home country for a firm to 
have a foreign operation. Although profit maximization is the most important motive 
taken in consideration during the process of makmg an investment decision, it is not 
the only motive. One of the other motives is the growth of a firm, whch is formulated 
by Penro~e.'~ Firms produce and make innovations in new products and primarily they 
grow. According to money (MI) - commodities - money - circulation (M2), the final 
value of money obtained from the production process is higher than the initial value of 
the money (MI). In the first step, investors buy capital goods and pay wages to 
laborers. During the production process, owing to the surplus value created, the final 
value of the commodity exceeds the initial amount of money used in the production 
process. Hence, the firm constantly wdl be in a tendency of growth. In growing, firms 
may go abroad, and in going abroad, they grow abroad. The motivation of direct 
investment is the growth of markets rather than profits. Direct investment activities 
wdl increase if investors believe that they will achieve a satisfying sale amount related 
with the market size. As the market grows, the firms grow simultaneously. However, 
the growth of fLrm approach is insufficient to explain the investor's attitude. 
Kindleberger argues the importance of profit motivation rather than the growth of 
market approach by giving an example about an automobile company's behavior: 
32 Kindleberger, p.7, reference to E.T. Penrose "Foreign Investment and the Growth of Firm", 
Economic Journal 66 (June 1956), pp. 220-235. 
"Volkswagen Company, whch enjoys substantial sales in the United States, but 
deliberately refrains from domestic manufacture, having in fact first bought and then 
sold a former Stud baker plant at Linden, ~ e w  ~ersey".~%t his point, even though the 
firm has a large market demand, it prefers to satisfy that demand by exporting instead 
producing in the foreign country. 
The second view of the growth of firm approach has to do with drrect 
investment rather than markets. T h s  is explained by the cost of capital to the f m .  
Retained earnings are not only cheaper capital than loans but also as cheap as to 
approach a negative cost. Hence, the firm should reinvest its retained earnings rather 
than pay out profits." Through this process the firm grows more in its native country 
than it grows in the foreign country. However, this view neglects the profit-risk 
analyzes and simplifies the foreign drrect investment decision with the growth of a frrm 
by reinvesting the retained earnings. 
In brief, the growth of the firm approach explains the FDI in two ways. One 
of them is that firms grow as the markets grow and they begm to invest abroad as a 
consequence of the growth process. The other one implies that firms, by reinvesting 
retained earnings grow and as a result they invest abroad and continue to grow in 
foreign markets. However, although these approaches reveal some essential points, 
they do not satisfactorily explain the investment behavior of a firm. 
One of the business theories explaining FDI is the penetration into a new 
market. In the nineteenth century, FDI were concentrated in the fields of petroleum 
and raw materials. After the 1950s, they were concentrated in manufacturing industries 
in order to penetrate new markets. With high economic growth rates and higher birth 
33 Ibid., p.8. 
34 Mehmet $ahin, Tiirkiye'de Yabanct Sermaye Yatlrtmlar~ (Ankara: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yaymlar, 
1975), p. 17- 18; Kindleberger, p. 10. 
rates, developing countries became attractive to foreign investors. In these countries, 
excess demand for manufactured goods, foreign exchange difficulties, and import 
restrictions made investment more attractive to foreign investors than exportation.35 
The empirical studies of the Mikesell-Raymond, Robinson and Ashkm concerning the 
motives behind FDI reveal that, motives are complex and not singularly "profit 
oriented" as is generally believed and the results of the questionnaires with several 
American companies revealed that "penetration in to a new market" and "anticipation 
of relatively hlgher profit" as the most important mot ive~ .~Vhe  size of the market is 
one of the important factors influencing the decisions of investing companies. 
Market size became more important as it is used as an indication of profit 
possibility. A small market is correlated with uncertainty. Yet more than market size, 
its future potential is important. Thus, market size should not be h k e d  with only its 
dimension but also with its future potential. For instance, Nurkse explains the 
inducement to invest is h t e d  by the size of the market and the limitation of capital 
by the size of the market, developing countries cannot attain large proportions of 
Another important motive for an American company to invest abroad is 
"matchmg or forestahg a competitor's move". Accordmg to some economists, 
American companies have a different frame of reference regarding foreign investment 
than do the developing countries. Aside from the fundamental motivation of earning 
35 Baran Tuncer, Tiirkiye'de Yabancr Sermaye Sorunu (Ankara: Ankara ~niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler 
Fakiiltesi Yaymlari, 1968), p.34; 
Hans.W. Singer and Javed A. Ansari, Rich and Poor Countries: Consequences of International 
EconomicDisorder (London: Boston: Unwin Hyman 1988), p.242. 
36 Djemal Ashkin, Evaluation of Private Foreign Investment Climate in Turkey (Florida State 
University, D.B.A., 1972), p. 99-109; Harry J. Robinson, The Motivation and Flow of Private 
Foreign Investment (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, 196 I), p.25; Raymond F. 
Mikesell, US Private and Government Invest Abroad (Eugene: University of Oregon Books, 1962), 
p.19 
37 Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1953), pp.6- 1 1. 
profits, they are concerned with the degree of uncertainty and risk perceived in an 
investment decision.38 J.C. Schreiber writes that American companies are 
fundamentally motivated to make profit; however, the magnitude of profit sought is 
tempered by the desire to minimize risk and uncertainty. Schreiber reached this 
conclusion using data and information obtained through interviews and a mail 
questionnaire survey conducted among American companies in Taiwan. Aharoni 
argues American companies' investments in Israel reveal that the motive for foreign 
investors is minimum levels of risk and ~ncertainty~~.  
It has been already discussed how the motives of companies in making 
investment decisions depend mostly on the business policies of each company. 
However, there are other factors, mostly related with the host country, which are also 
important in influencing companies in their foreign investment decisions. These 
factors, some of which can be manipulated or adjusted, are in most cases under the 
control of the host country. It is important that the factors influencing companies' 
decisions to invest abroad directly reflect their investment motives. The size of the 
market is the one of the most important factors influencing the companies to invest 
abroad as penetration into new market is a great motivation. The size of the market 
becomes important, especially during the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
process of developing countries. In the IS1 strategy, tariffs are raised to protect the 
domestic sector from the inflow of cheap foreign goods. Protectionist policies and 
subsidies create profitable circumstances for foreign companies to invest in the host 
country. 
38 Jordan C. Schreiber, US Corporate Investment in Taiwan (New York: The Dunellen Company, 
1970), p. I .  
39 Yair Aharoni, The Foreign Investment Decision Process (Boston: Haward University, Graduate 
School of Business Administration, 1966), p.24 1. 
Another important factor influencing the decisions of companies to invest 
abroad is the availabhty of foreign exchange for repatriation. It is important because, 
no matter how profitable a market, if foreign exchange is not available to repatriate the 
profits, no company will be w&g to invest in such a country. Political stabhty and 
government attitude toward private investment are recognized as equally important. 
Actually there is a close relationship between these factors. If in a country, there is a 
lack of political stability, even the government's favorable attitude toward private 
investment will not satisfy the foreign investors, who believe no investment in such a 
country is secure. 
The availability of cheap labor, especially in developing countries, may be an 
important factor in the decision makmg process on investment abroad. On the other 
hand, the investments of foreign companies mostly are concentrated in capital- 
intensive industries in developing countries. In addition, foreign companies employ 
skilled labor rather than cheap, unskilled labor in developing countries. These 
arguments will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. Even so at &s point, it 
may be said that the cheap labor factor may be important in cases where export is the 
dominant motive of the company investing abroad. 
The theories and approaches discussed above try to explain the influences 
and motives of a company deciding to invest abroad. The common conclusion that 
emerges from the approaches is that profitabihty is the most important factor, 
although it is not the only factor. Others are the degree of uncertainty and risk, 
penetration into a new market, taking advantage of market imperfections, and 
abundance of cheap raw materials (especially in developing countries). Some theories 
also argue the importance of the growth of the f m  and the growth of markets to 
explain FDI activities. In most cases, the approaches point out some essential points, 
yet in some cases they are inadequate to explain the investment motive wholly. For 
instance, according to "the growth of the market" approach, as the market size 
enlarges, production for the market increases in a country. Yet even though there is a 
hlgh demand potential, an automobile company may prefer to export rather than 
produce in the foreign country. Cheap and plentiful raw materials generally exist in 
developing countries; hence this factor cannot explain the decision of a company 
investing in a developed country. These factors contribute to the explanation of the 
factors encouraging du-ect investment abroad. However, since the investment climate 
is hfferent in every country, and is subject to change, it is desirable that every country 
foreign investment clunate be constantly reviewed. 
The Effects of FDI on Host Countries 
The next step further studying the motives of FDI is the effects of 
operations of foreign firms on host countries. T h s  issue became suspicious exactly in 
developing countries. In these countries the main &scussion is whether FDI just 
exploits the country's resources or has a positive effect on the economy. For instance, 
the unrestrained activities of foreign firms -thanks to the privileges that were given, in 
the Ottoman Empire led the people and bureaucrats in Turkey to act prudently 
towards the FDI issue. Hence, studying the relation between the host countries and 
foreign firms remains noteworthy. Studies on the effects of FDI are divided into two 
main branches, the neo-classical school and the dependency school. These works bring 
with them the question of the power of host countries to regulate FDI. In the 1970s, a 
new school named the bargaining school, emerged around this issue. The bargaining 
school examines the relationship between FDI and the governments of host countries. 
It holds that the relative power of MNCs and host governments is a function of 
condtions of the firm, industry and country involved. 
The neo-classical school examines the welfare costs and benefits of FDI and 
emphasizes that the economic benefits of FDI are more relevant than the economic 
costs of FDI. Edward M. Graham and Paul Krugrnan, in the article "Economic 
Impact", argue that the benefits of FDI can be categorized in two groups: the 
facilitation of trade in goods and services, and external benefits.'"' In some cases, 
transaction costs may be reduced when international trade takes the form of FDI and 
FDI facilitates trade in goods, services and knowledge. For some scholars of the neo- 
classical school, FDI generally brings benefits over the usual gains from trade. 
The most frequently cited external benefit is the introduction of new 
technology, which includes not only science-based production but also management 
skills to the host country. The technological progress brought by inward foreign 
investment is generally assumed to be beneficial by definition, but this is true in general 
only to the extent that technical progress is a free good. Harry G. Johnson underlines, 
if the return on the technology brought by foreign investment is entirely absorbed by 
the foreign companies, the prices of commodities to consumers and the prices of 
factors of production in the economy remaining unchanged, there is no direct benefit 
to the economy.41 Under such conditions the only benefit the country receives is 
revenues from the taxation of the earnings of technological capital. Then the firm has 
the ability to earn profits higher than domestic firms earn through superior technology. 
40 Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugrnan, "Economic impact" in Foreign Direct Investment in 
the United States, Second Edition (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1989) pp 
28-29. 
41 Harry G. Johnson, "The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of the International Corporations", 
in Charles Kindleberger (ed), The International Corporation (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1970), 
pp.44-45. 
One of the most discussed effects of FDI involves employment. It is 
expectable that FDI has a positive effect on employment. However, empirical studies 
done in the U.S. show that FDI almost surely has very little net effect on overall 
employment.42 According to Krugman, a wave of FDI into the U.S. turned out to have 
a positive effect on the demand for U.S. workers. Yet the Federal Reserve applies tight 
monetary policies in order to avoid accelerating inflation, so that any jobs resulting 
from the investment are offset by job losses e l~ewhere .~~ Therefore, although FDI has 
essentially no effect on total employment, it is important to note that h s  situation is 
valid only in the countries in which the central bank seeks to avoid accelerating 
inflation. The case is somewhat dfferent in developing countries. Foreign f m s  mostly 
invest in the capital-intensive sectors and create unemployment by employing skilled 
workers offering a hlgher salary than the local firms. By &IS way, foreign firms 
decrease the number of s u e d  workers in the sector and by increasing the wages raise 
the level of unemployment -in the country. There may be an expectation from FDI to 
the effect that it increases real wages by bringing in more capital to compete for the 
services of labor as it enters the economy. However, Vernon, in one of his studies 
about the Leontief paradox, found that the capital-intensive sectors are not intensive in 
material capital.44 Therefore it would be not wrong to say that FDI tends to flow into 
the more capital-intensive sectors of the economy, and that the effect of the inflow of 
foreign investment is to raise the rate of return on capital and reduce the wages of 
labor by increasing the demand for capital and reducing the demand for labor. 
The dependency school leads the second approach studying the relationship 
between FDI and the host country. According to this school, the effect of FDI is not 
42 Graham and Krugman, pp.30-3 1 .  
43 Ibid., p 3 1 .  
44 Vernon, p.46. 
positive on the host country as the neo-classical school suggested. FDI affects the very 
political, social and economic fabric of the host country, weakening the country and its 
economic development as a result of increasing dependency on FDI. 
Dependency means a situation in which the economy of a country is 
conditioned by and subjected to the development and expansion of another 
economy.45 The dependency school emphasize that the industrial development is 
dependent on the export sector for the foreign currency to buy the inputs utilized by 
the industrial sector. However, the international price elasticity of the exports of the 
Latin American countries is lower and for this reason, foreign frnancing becomes 
necessary, as industrial development is strongly conditioned by obtaining exchange for 
capital and intermediary goods. However, capital goods, such as machmery, are not 
freely avdable in the international market; they are patented and belong to big 
companies and they are not sold as trade goods. Rather, companies demand payment 
of royalties for the machinery equipment. As a result the host country government 
facilitates the entry of foreign capital into the country because local companies do not 
have enough foreign exchange for machinery equipment. Under the protection of high 
tariff barriers, foreign companies enjoy high rates of profit from their exemptions from 
exchange controls for the importation of machmery and the increased availability of 
loans through foreign aid and low interest rate conditions. To strengthen the 
argument, some statistical data is used. According to Dos Santos, from 1946 to 1967 
the new entries of capital were 5,415 million dollars into Latin America and the sum of 
reinvested profits was 4,424 d o n  dollars. The ratio of remitted capital to new flow 
was around 2.7 in that period; that is, for each dollar that entered $2.70 left.& 
- - - - 
45 Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence7', American Economic Review (May, 1970), 
p.23 1. 
46 Ibid., p.234. 
To sum up, the Dependency school argues that the benefits of foreign 
investment are unequally distributed between the MNC and the host country. As a 
result, FDI takes place not because of a higher marginal rate of return but because of 
some special technique, which is not available to local entrepreneurs, exploits only 
through h e c t  ownership. Furthermore, the dependency school argues that, MNCs 
employ capital intensive technologies when they move in, adding to host country's rate 
of unemployment and worsening the distribution of income. MNCs also dlstort the 
host country political processes by collaborating with the local elites, by using their 
influence in their home countries to bring pressure to keep host government in lu~e.~'  
In addition to these views, the effects of Japanese-style FDI on host countries can be 
added to the analysis. As mentioned above, Kojima asserts that Japanese-style FDI can 
be beneficial for both the development process and trade activities of the developing 
country. He asserts that Japanese-style FDI concentrates in industries in which the 
host country has an overt comparative advantage and Japanese-style FDI has a 
teachmg role in host countries and promotes the balanced and orderly industrialization 
of receiving developing nations. 
In the 1970s as the volume of FDI activities and, in parallel, works on FDI 
began to increase substantially, studying the relationship between MNCs and host 
countries became relevant. Scholars became interested in the issue of whether 
developing countries have the ability to exercise control over MNCs. This issue was 
brought out in conditions in which developing countries were expecting rapid 
industrialization progress and demanding that MNCs invest in specific sectors, 
favorable for rapid industrialization. Furthermore, the transformation of the 
47 Theodore H. Moran,, "Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for 
Dependentistas and Non Dependentistas" International Organization 32, no. 1 (Winter 1978) pp. 80- 
94. 
industrialization strategies of these countries from an import substitution 
industrialization strategy toward an export-oriented strategy led the governments of 
host countries to make extra efforts to direct MNCs to invest in export-oriented 
sectors. 
Owing to these improvement mentioned above in the 1970s two major 
schools of thought contended on whether or not developing countries can increase 
their power over multinational enterprises, the Dependency school and the "bargaining 
school". 
The bargaining school seeks to understand the relationship between 
developing countries and MNCs. The main question is to determine who gets the 
benefits after the investment takes place. At first, when a firm controls s o m e h g  that 
a government wants, the firm's power would be improved in any bargaining process 
between the parties. Over time, the bargaining power relationship can shift to 
"obsolescing bargain" which refers to the deche  of the power of a firm when it has 
heavily invested in the host c o ~ n t r y . ~  
In early interactions, the balance of power and benefits often favor the 
multinational. Although the developing country controls access to its markets, the 
enterprise has more important bargaining assets through its control of capital, 
technology and managerial s k ~ l l s . ~ ~  However, after the MNC invests heavily in the host 
country, the host country starts to gain the bargaining power, which was controlled 
before by the company. As the country attains greater bargaining power, it forces the 
balance of benefits to shift in its f a ~ o r . ~ "  Therefore, the bargaining school first accepts 
the bargaining power of the MNC over the host country. In this situation, it is not easy 
-- 
48 Vernon, pp.96-104. 
49 Joseph M. Grieco, "Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's Experience with the 
International Computer Industry" International Organization 36, no.3 (Summer, 1982), p. 61 0. 
50 Ibid., p.610. 
for the host country to duect the activities of MNCs for its own purposes or benefits. 
However, as the foreign company settles down in the country, the host government 
starts to gain the bargaining power and forces the balance of benefits manage these 
relations more effectively. 
The MNCs bargaining power resources discussed most frequently in the 
literature are: technology, managerial skills, capital, and access to markets. The major 
host country's bargaining power resource is access to the domestic market, and its 
value is a function of its size (population or income), its rate of growth, and its 
development in terms of income per capita.51 
On the other hand the Dependencia approach gves attention to the 
dependency of the host countries on the MNCs. According to the dependency school, 
the major decisions about the evolution of industries in developing countries are made 
by the MNCs. Hence, there is no ground to talk about the bargaining power of the 
host country to direct the investments in its favor. Although recent studles by Marxist- 
Dependencia writers have introduced in to their analyses the contribution of MNCs to 
the economic growth of several advanced developing countries and recognize the 
phenomenon of bargaining between developing countries and MNCs in which the 
former may extract some concessions from the latter, compared to the bargaining 
school, the Marxist-Dependencia school maintains that what bargaining that does take 
place is over marginal issues, and sees very little chance of developing countries' being 
able to try to attain fundamentally greater control over multinationals operating in their 
Industries in developing countries may grow due to the presence of 
MNCs, yet these industries stay outside the control of the host country. 
5 1 Stephen J. Kobrin, "Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing 
Countries" International Organization. 4 1, no.4 (Autumn, 1987), pp.6 19-62 1. 
'' Ibid., p.610. 
Recent studies on India's improving performance from 1960 to 1980 in 
dealing with the international computer industry have revealed the bargaining power of 
host countries. By the mid-1960s the Indian government had stated to the MNCs that 
India should participate in the ownership and control of foreign computer subsidiaries 
in the country, should have access to the sources of supply for most of the country's 
computer needs, and should participate in the manufacture of the advanced systems 
available internationally. The goals of the Indian government affected InQa's 
performance in computers over time. InQa at first was unsuccessful in shaping and 
directing the local activities of the multinational computer firms for its own favor, as 
Vernon states. Yet, over time, I n l a  took the advantage of developments in 
international computing to reconstruct relations with the international computer firms 
on terms more favorable to it and increased its ability to manage its relations with the 
foreign computer firms operating in India. Finally, the data processing industry grew 
more inward directed than it had been before in India. It can be suggested that, the 
access to the domestic markets, the existence of a strong state and local entrepreneurs 
give developing countries an important advantage to drrect foreign f m s  in favor of 
the host country. 
In sum, it is clear that FDI theories were generated especially in the 1960s 
and in the 1970s and these theories also reflect the economic and political conjuncture 
of the international system in this period. However, these theories are inadequate to 
explain completely the motives of investing abroad. These are mostly case studies and 
they can be insufficient explaining other cases. For example, the theory of Hymer's - 
market imperfection- successfully explains the motives and activities of the U.S. f m s ;  
however, it is insufficient to explain the Japanese style of investment. Therefore, this 
thesis suggests that there is not any general FDI theory that explains the motives and 
activities of foreign firms. 
In this chapter, also the relationshlp between the MNCs and the 
governments was examined. The governments of developing countries generally 
encourage the inflow of FDI into their countries to sustain higher economic growth 
rates. The inflow of the FDI is very important for these countries. In the next chapter, 
the relationshlp between FDI and developing countries is analyzed in detail. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE NECESSITYOF EXTERNAL SOURCES IN LDCs 
The Economic Growth Dilemma of LDCs 
As most of the colonies became independent nation-states after the end of 
the Second World War, many governments of these countries began to encourage the 
inflow of FDI. The governors of these countries were intensely interested in economic 
development, growth and welfare and their efforts were strongly related with the 
sustainable economic development. Simultaneously, in developed countries, Keynesian 
economic policies, which call for increases especially in government expendtures, were 
adopted to maintain economic stabhty and to reach a substantial economic growth 
rate. While in developed countries, economies had the chance to reach full 
employment levels in developing countries, however, it was difficult to reach full 
employment levels because of the scarcity of capital. Therefore, Keynesian economic 
polices were not directly applicable to developing countries. 
As a result, economic development dealing with the problem of the 
economic growth of developing countries emerged as a branch of economics. 
Development economists generated theories about economic development and 
proposed models for developing countries to realme high rates of growth. They 
focused on increases in per capita and related such increases to certain major factors, 
such as capital accumulation, population growth, and technological process. The 
importance of models proposed by development economists increased under the Cold 
War conditions. The transformation of colonies into independent nation states 
increased competition between the Western block and the Soviet block to integrate 
these states into their economic systems. Hence, development economy as a branch of 
economics, and theories and models generated by development economists became 
very important under the conditions of the two-poled world economic sy~tern.~' 
As mentioned above, economic growth became the main issue in developing 
countries after the Second World War. Economic growth is generally accepted as a 
numerically measurable increase in the production capacity in an economy. In other 
words, economic growth means an increase of the GNP in an economy. An increase in 
income level per capita requires an increase in the production capacity and an increase 
in production can be obtained by an increase in investments every year. To increase 
the investment level of an economy, a certain amount of output should be saved and 
should be du-ected into investments every year. However, a low level of income 
capacity brings a low level of savings with it. T h ~ s  is because margmal propensity to 
save is low at low levels of income. Actually, the dilemma of developing countries 
emerges in this point. In these countries, there is a demand for economic growth, but 
low levels of income, low levels of investment, and savings blocks the economic 
growth process. In addition, even though there can be an increase in the GNP, as 
populations increase, the GNP per capita can remain at the same level. Ragnar Nurkse 
uses the phrase "the vicious circle of poverty" to describe the problem of economic 
development, and explains the conditions of developing countries with a seemingly 
trite proposition: "A country is poor because it is poor".54 Of course, this is a simple 
explanation and a tautology. However, there are some other important points that 
Nurkse has observed. According to him, the main problem of developing countries is 
53 George A. Petrochilos, Foreign Direct Investment and the Development Process: The Case of 
Greece (Vermont: Avebury 1989) pp. 1-2. 
54 Nurkse, p. 4. 
the accumulation of capital. "A circular relationship exists on both sides of the 
problem of capital formation in the poverty-ridden areas of the world. On the supply 
side, there is the small capacity to save, resulting from the low level of real income. 
The low- real income is a reflection of low productivity, whch in its turn is due largely 
to the lack of capital. The lack of capital is a result of the small capacity to save, and so 
the circle is complete".55 On the demand side, due to the small real income, the 
inducement to invest may be low. It is also due to the low level of productivity, which 
is a result of the small amount of capital used in production. Although Nurkse states 
that there are matters of unilateral causation that can keep a country poor -for instance 
lack of mineral resources- yet implies that lack of adequate capital equipment is the 
main reason for underdevelopment. Therefore such a view emerges from the 
statements: it is d~fficult to maintain a high economic growth rate in an 
underdeveloped country by its own dynamics. The flow of foreign capital into a 
developing country will have an accelerant effect in the economies of developing. 
Foreign investments wdl affect the economies of developing countries positively. 
In sum, inadequate investment, savings, income block the purpose of 
developing countries, to realize high economic growth rates, and capital levels. 
Therefore, the governments of developing countries encouraged the inflow of foreign 
capital by arranging foreign investment laws. 
Moreover the necessity of external sources for developing countries also 
arises as a result of balance of payments deficits. In the 1950s most of the developing 
countries applied a strategy called Import Substitution Industrialization. The general 
aim of this strategy is to maintain the production of commodities, which cannot be 
produced, in the domestic industry. For this purpose, the state protects infant 
55 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
industries from the competition of foreign f m s ,  increases tariffs to diminish the 
importation of the final goods, and, decreases the tariffs of capital and intermelate 
goods, whch are used in the investment and production process. However, the 
dependence of domestic producers on capital and intermelate goods, whch cannot 
be produced in the domestic market, increases the balance of payment deficits. 
It's a general fact that in developing countries, demand for imported goods 
increases gradually. Yet, over-valuated domestic currency obstructs the exportation of 
domestic goods. Hence it becomes difficult to find foreign exchange to compensate 
the demand for imports. In h s  way, the necessity of external sources also emerges as a 
result of balance of payment deficits in developing countries. In addition to the 
difficulty of LDCs to increase their saving ratios and their inability to finance imports 
through their export earnings, there are some additional facts constraining the 
economic growth rate, such as low education levels, inadequate technology, and 
inadequate structural arrangements of the type necessary for the economic 
development. The constraints of economic growth mentioned above are known as the 
two-gap model in development economics and it implies a situation in whlch foreign 
assistance, in the form of either aid or FDI, is necessary for the balance of payments 
and it is necessary to exceed the income level that is determined by the scarcity of 
capital. 
In sum, after the Second World War, government policies to reahe high 
economic growth rates brought the necessity of external sources with them, due to low 
levels of investment, savings, income and capital. In addition, the dependency of 
foreign producers on imported capital and intermediate goods increased the necessity 
of external sources in developing countries. 
Discussions on the Effects of Foreign Investments 
To realize a sustained economic growth rate foreign investment is necessary, 
as mentioned above. However, some economists claim that foreign investments 
mostly do not positively affect the economies of developing countries. According to 
Singer, FDI in the long run have negative effects on balance of payments. In addtion, 
he points out that FDI generally do not flow in the form of cash; instead, foreign 
investors often borrow from the capital markets to invest in the host countries. 
Therefore, mostly the host countries' sources fmance the foreign investments rather 
than external so~rces.~%inger also states that foreign investments employ skdled labor 
rather than unskilled labor by offering high wage rates. Therefore, it becomes hard for 
domestic investors to employ skilled labor by offering appropriate wages. Last, Singer 
questions the effect of FDI by analyzing the Qstribution of investment abroad with 
respect to industries. His study shows that in the nineteenth century, FDI were 
concentrated in producing consumer goods for domestic markets in developed 
countries. However, FDI were concentrated in the export-oriented sectors in Third 
World countries to export raw materials and cornmoQties to developed countries. 
Hence, the economies of developed countries were positively affected rather than 
economies of the developing c~untries.~' In addtion to the Singer's view, Baran states 
that the interests of companies exporting raw materials to the markets of the 
developed countries did not lie in the general economic development of the host 
56 Singer and Ansari, pp.241-244. 
57 Ibid., p.242 
58 Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968) p. 197. 
3 9 
On the other hand, Nurkse talks about the positive affects of FDI 
concentrated in export-oriented sectors. Accordmg to him, British foreign investments 
from 1870 to 1914 in railways securities provided a useful foundation for the general 
development of the borrowing countries.59 1n some of these countries, governments 
borrowed heavily from international capital markets for the purpose of infrastructure 
investments, which led to a high economic growth rate in following years as a result of 
the integration of markets. However, Singer argues that investment in these countries 
was channeled to sectors that were linked to the economy of the investor country 
rather than the host country and that foreign investment, whether direct or portfolio 
was invariably directed to economic activities-such as commercial institutions and the 
socio-economic infrastructure connected with the export trade.6" Hence, the 
contribution of FDI in core countries is irrelevant for Singer. 
As mentioned above, in the nineteenth century the MNCs were concentrated 
in the export-oriented and the service sectors in LDCs. However, between 1950 and 
1980 the MNCs were concentrated mostly in the manufacturing industry. This master 
thesis suggests that the MNCs act differently as the economic conjuncture and as the 
functioning of the international economic system change. Therefore, in the next 
chapter, the relationshp between the economic conjuncture and the MNCs activities 
will be analyzed. 
59 Nurkse, pp. 24-25. 
60 Ibid., pp.242-243. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE PATTERNS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Most of the theories explaining the incentives of FDI are typically case 
studies, which usually bring out some aspects of foreign investment rather than 
generating a wide-rangmg theory of FDI. This situation has led scholars to use 
historical data in their studies to seek out the general characteristics of FDI. The 
studies have revealed that the activities of MNCs are in harmony with the international 
economic conjuncture. The international economic conjuncture reflects the general 
characteristics of a period. 
Until 1914, private capital movement (which can also be termed portfolio 
investment), in the form of bonds and debt investments, was a much more important 
component of international financial flows than direct foreign investment. In 1914, 
about seventy percent of total United Kmgdom and French long-term investments 
consisted of government and railway bonds6'. As the major characteristics of FDI are 
considered in the nineteenth century, first, it should be stated that the flow of foreign 
investment mostly took place between developed countries. As Table 2 shows, about 
four-fifths of the foreign capital stake in 1914 was directed to developing countries. 
The manufacturing investments oriented towards local markets were mainly 
concentrated in Europe (including the U.K., Russia) and the U.S. Second, FDI in late 
developing countries, especially in Latin America, was concentrated in the production 
61 Douglas C. North, "International Capital Movements in Historical Perspective" in U.S. Private 
and Government Abroad ed. Raymond Mikesell (Eugene: University of Oregon Books) 1962 Pp. 
20-2 1. 
of raw materials and export-oriented commodities such as rubber, sugar, tobacco, tea, 
coffee and cocoa. In addition, FDI in these countries also was concentrated in the 
service sector, in areas, banking and infrastructure investments such as 
Furthermore in the nineteenth century, language, cultural, political and 
trading ties as well as geographical distance played more important roles in the decision 
making process of foreign investment than they do today. For instance seventy two 
percent of U.S. investment was in other parts of the American continent, while there 
was a strong colonial content in British, French and Belgian involvement in developing 
countries.63 During the nineteenth century foreign investment activities and flow of 
portfolio investment reached very high levels. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century the ratio of the transfers flow from Britain was equivalent to four percent of 
the GNP of those years. This ratio reached to seven percent of the GNP in 1914 .~~  
The interwar years witnessed a significant decrease in the expansion of 
foreign direct investment. Thls was due mostly to the negative effects of the Great 
Depression that began in the U.S. in 1929. In ths  period, Great Britain was no longer 
wilhg to play the role of leader of the international economic system, whch had 
negative repercussions on international trade because of a lack of a strong international 
currency and international institutes replating trade activities. Plus, beggar-thy- 
neighbor policies had negative influences on international trade. 
62 for the Ottoman Empire see Sevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capituh~m. 1820- 
1913: Trude,Investment and Production. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Pres, 1987) 
. 55-81. 
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Brookfield, Vt., USA : E. Elgar, 1990, p.6. 
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Table 2 Estimated Stock of Accumulated FDI by Recipient Country or Area 
North America 
USA 1,450 10.3 1,800 7.4 7.5 13.9 13.9 8.4 42.4 11.7 
Canada 800 5.7 2,296 9.4 12.9 23.7 27.9 16.8 43.2 11.9 
Europe 
Western Europe 1,100 7.8 1,800 7.4 12.5 22.9 47.4 28.5 136.2 37.7 
Of which UK 200 1.4 700 2.9 5.0 9.2 13.4 8.1 32.5 9.0 
Other European 1,400 9.9 400 1.6 
Of which Russia 1,000 7.1 
A stralasia and 
So 1 th Africa 450 3.2 1,950 8.0 3.6 6.6 16.7 10.0 23.9 6.6 
Japan 35 0.2 100 0.4 0.1 0.2 2.5 1.5 6.0 1.7 
Developing Countries 8,850 62.8 15,969 65.7 17.6 32.3 51.4 30.9 100.4 27.8 
Latin America 4,600 32.7 7,481 30.8 8.5 15.6 29.6 17.8 52.5 14.5 
Africa 900 6.4 1,799 7.4 3.0 5.5 8.8 5.3 11.1 3.1 
Asia 2,950 20.9 6,068 25.0 4.1 7.5 7.8 4.7 25.2 7.0 
Southern Europe 0.5 0.9 1.7 1.0 3.4 0.9 
Middle East 400 2.8 621 2.6 1.5 2.8 3.5 2.1 8.2 2.3 
International and Unallocated 6.5 3.9 9.5 2.6 
TOTAL 14,085 100.0 24,315 100.0 54.5 100.0 166.3 100.0 361.6 100.0 
Source; Dunning 1990, p.7. 
T h e  negative effect o f  the Great  Depression o n  portfolio investment was 
greater than o n  FDI. As  mentioned above, in the nineteenth century, portfolio 
investment had  the largest share in total foreign investment. A s  the  financial markets 
collapsed after the crisis o n  Wall Street, the volume o f  private capital flow decreased 
substantially. Furthermore, the international capital stake rose quite substantially i n  the 
inter-war years.65 In this period, the Americas continued to attract more than two- 
thirds of the U.S. direct investment stake; the role of U.S. participation in Europe fell 
in the 1920s and recovered somewhat in the 1930s, as did European investments in the 
U.S. There were also several new MNCs emerged in such as new oil investment (in the 
Gulf of Mexico), and non-ferrous metals (in Latin America) in the developing 
countries in the inter-war years. In addtion, there was a substantial expansion of public 
u&ty investments in Latin America by U.S. firms". 
After the Second World War, the international direct investment stake rose 
modestly between 1945 and 1960. In this period, the share of FDI in the total foreign 
investment increased significantly. Also, the pre-war trend for MNCs to favor 
developed countries for new investment activities continued after 1945. The 
expansion of MNCs activities in developing countries decreased. In 1914, two-thds 
of the capital stake had been directed to developing countries; by 1938 this had fallen 
to fifty-five percent, and in 1960 it was nearly forty percent. In other words, the rate of 
increase of the foreign f%m activities in developed countries was much higher than that 
in developing countries. 
Between 1950 and 1980, the United States was the major source of 
investment flows to developing countries, on average responsible for over half of the 
total. Most U.S. investment in developing countries was in manufacturing, with 
chemicals and machmery the most important (as in the Turkish case). Japan took 
second place, with special focus on East Asia. Japanese investment concentrated in 
mining to supply raw materials for Japan. Also, manufactures, metals, chemicals and 
textiles were important. France and Germany (West) increased their outflows. For 
France, commercial services were more important according to data from the IMF in 
6s Ibid., p.8. 
66 Ibid., p.9. 
1985. One of the characteristics of FDI in this period was the concentration of MNCs 
in the production of comrnodlties for domestic markets rather than focusing on the 
production of export-oriented cornrnodlties and raw materials, as in the nineteenth 
century. 
Until 1980, the annual net flow of FDI to developed countries was $15 
billion. However, after 1980, the net flow of FDI to developed countries jumped to 
$175 bdlion in 1988 and reached $250 billion in 1997. Also in developing countries, a 
rapid increase in FDI inflow was observed. The annual net flow of FDI to developing 
countries jumped from $15 billion in 1980 to $50 billion in 1995 and $150 billion in 
1997.~' 
67 UNCTAD, Report by the Secretariet of the UNCTAD, geneva: UNCTAD, 1999, p. 116. 
Table 3 Percentage Breakdown of Number of Manufacturing Subsidies of MNCs by Country 
of Location Subsidiaries Established 1946-1 96 1 
US Based MNCs UK Based MNCs Continental European Japanese 
Based MNCs Based MNCs 
Developed Countries 
North America 
USA 
Canada 
Europe 
Japan 
Australasia and 
South Africa 
Developing Countries 
Middle East 
Africa 
Asia 
Latin America 
TOTAL 
Number of Subsidiaries 2009 684 609 65 
Source: Dunning, 1990, p. 12. 
Table 3 suggests that Japanese based MNCs mostly invested in developing 
countries rather than developed countries. Between 1946 and 1961,99.3 % of Japanese 
based subsidiaries were established in the developing countries. This situation is 
directly related with the Kojima's argumentation. The Japanese-Style MNCs mostly 
concentrated in developing countries in which they have comparative disadvantages. 
On the other hand, the U.S. and the European based MNCs mostly 
concentrated in the developed countries. This situation is generally explained by the 
hgh  income elasticity of the demand in the developed countries. As considered for the 
developing countries, U.S. and the European based MNCs mostly invested in Latin 
American countries rather than in Asia or Middle East. 0.4% of U.S. based MNCs 
concentrated Middle Eastern and 30.6O/o of U.S. based MNCs concentrated in the 
Latin American countries. Therefore it can be suggested that some of the developing 
countries strongly dtffer from the others in receiving FDI. 
Turkey is in the category of developing countries and receives insigmficant 
FDI flow. Most of the developing countries-especially Latin American Countries- 
receive higher amounts of FDI than Turkey. In the next sections the reasons for the 
inadequate flow of FDI to Turkey will be examined. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FDI IN TURKEY 1950-1 980 
The investment and operation of foreign companies in Turkey goes back to 
the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century, owing to the arrangements signed 
between the Ottoman Empire and several European countries, there was a climate 
encouraging the operation of foreign companies. Foreign companies established 
enterprises operating in railways, electricity, service sector and maritime lines and 
harbors. In 1914, they b d t  up economic monopolies dominating the basic services. 
After the Turhsh War for Independence, the new Turkish Republic 
abolished the capitulations and aimed to impede the domination of foreign firms in the 
public sector. There is a commonly shared belief in Turkey regarding the government's 
anti-FDI stance in the first years of the Republic. However, in the 1920s the 
governments' attitude toward FDI was positive and the local firms were encouraged to 
collaborate with foreign firms." As Tezel suggested "the capitalist development 
strategy adopted in the 1920 was harmonious with FDI activities and collaboration of 
local firms with the foreign firms."" An outstanding example of ths  occurred during 
the War for Independence when in the National Assembly; there was a discussion 
about the entrance of a foreign frrm to collaborate with a Turkish representative in 
Turkey. Most of the representative gave their support to the Turkish partner of the 
foreign firm. The interesting point is the foreign firm's nationality was Italian and 
68 Korkut Boratav, "Iktisat Tarihi" (1908-1980) in Turkiye Tarihi 4 C a g d a ~  Turkiye 1908-1980 
(istanbul: Cem Yaymevi). 1997. 
69 Yahya Sezai Tezel, Cumhuriyet Doneminin iktisadi Tarihi (1923-1950) Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt 
Yayinlari, 2000. p. 196. 
Turkey was at war with Italy at the In the 1920s several firms containing foreign 
capital obtained special statute from the government to invest in the manufacturing, 
mining sectors. Some of these firms are 1zmk Telefon Sirketi (Swedish-1925), Kueqlik 
Krom Maden Sirketi (French-1928)Jdana Elektrik Sirketi (German-1928) and the 
most well-known firm, Ford Motor Company (1929).~' However, in 1939 owing to the 
effects of the Great Depression, the plant of the Ford Motor Company stopped its 
production. In addition to the activities of foreign firms in the 1920s, the share of 
foreign capital was also important in total firms. Accordtng to ~ k q i i n ,  43% of total 
stock (of total companies) was belonged to the firms containing foreign capital 
between 1923 and1930.'' 
In 1929 the Great Depression affected the activities of MNCs directly. In 
Turkey, with the Depression of 1929, the Turlush government enacted new rules about 
the flow of foreign exchange. The restrictions cancelled the transfers of foreign firms 
and obstructed the entrance of new foreign firms because, as discussed above, the 
guarantee of transfer of profit was one of the main motives for foreign firms to invest 
in ~ u r k e ~ . ' ~  Also the expropriation of foreign f m s  between 1928 and 1944 did not 
create an attractive clunate for foreign firms to invest in Turkey. In this period, there 
was no FDI inflow to Turkey. 
It is generally accepted that after 1950 the flow of foreign capital into Turkey 
began to increase substantially. This was due to changes in the political climate. The 
former government, the RPP (Republican Peoples' Party), had applied Etatist policies 
70 Yahya Sezai Tezel, "Birinci Buyilk Millet Meclisinde Yabancl Sermaye Sorunu" in Ankara 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi, 25 (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakiiltesi 
Yaymlari, Mart 1970) pp.239-25 1. 
7 1 Tezel, Cumhuriyet Doneminin Iktisadi Tarihi (1923-1950) p. 196. 
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in the 1930s. During this period, induced by the Great Depression, most of the LDCs 
adopted Import Substitution Strategies PSI) to face with disappearing export markets 
and the resulting severe foreign exchange shortages. The main aim of this strategy is to 
manufacture previously imported simple, basic consumer goods. In this period 
although there wasn't a theoretical framework, Turkey experienced the IS1 process 
after the Great Depression. IS1 strategy does not require the state as the leader in the 
process; however, because of inadequate accumulation of private capital, the State took 
the leadership in the IS1 process by adopting etatist policies in Turkey. Etatism 
promotes and aims to realize higher economic growth rates by introducing the state as 
an economic agent or gving priority to the state activities rather than the private 
sector. The government by emergmg as an investor and producer aimed to make the 
state the leader in the economy. This affects the position of foreign firms in the 
economic development process. In other words, to realize hlgher economic growth 
rates where the private capital stock is inadequate for new and large-scale investments, 
etatist policies giving priority to the state in the economy as an investor and producer 
were adopted rather than gving priority to the private sector and foreign capital as an 
external source. It can be said that as the role and share of the state enterprises 
increased in the economic development process, the relative importance encouragmg 
FDI as an economic policy decreased between 1930 and 1945.'~ 
After the end of the Second World War major political and economic 
changes took place in Turkey owing to the developments in the international economic 
system and to domestic pressure. In the country many social groups had become 
dissatisfied with the RPP. On the other hand, the emergence of the U.S. as the 
dominant world power enabled the emergence of a new international economic 
74 Yahya Sezai Tezel, Cumhuriyet Dijneminin Iktisadi Tarihi (1923-1950) p.201. 
system, which had need of and suggested a more liberal and open economic model for 
countries. In addtion, Soviet territorial demands pushed the Turhsh government 
toward a closer relation with the western, developed countries. 
As a result of the facts mentioned above, the Turkish government rearranged 
its economic policies. On the other hand, international institutions such as the IBRD, 
the IMF and the U.S. were insisting that Turkey adopt liberal foreign trade policies and 
should give priority to agricultural production rather than industrialization. For 
instance a research team from IBRD stated, 'We do not suggest that Turkey should 
abandon its goal of industrialization. We suggest rather that the quickest path to that 
goal is through increased emphasis on agricultural development". For this purpose the 
1947 development program favoring agricultural production and emphasizing private 
capital was replaced with the development plan of 1946, which gave priority to state 
investments for the purpose of ind~strialization.'~ 
In 1947 a development plan encouraging FDI was dscussed and after this 
year laws about FDI were enacted to encourage inflow and foreign firms were allowed 
to transfer their profits abroad. Before 1947, the laws about FDI were not attractive 
for MNCs to invest in Turkey. With Law No. 1447 about "securities, stocks and bonds 
and foreign exchange markets", the exchange and exportation of foreign currency, 
stocks and bonds were reahed under the control of government. Law No. 1567, about 
the protection of the value of Turlush currency, regulated foreign exchange and capital 
market. In by-law No. 13, arranged in 1947, a new regulation was made for the 
"protection of the Value of Turkish Currency". This new regulation brought 
encouragement of foreign investment with it. Accordmg to this bylaw, dlrect 
'' ilhan Tekeli and Selim Ilkin, Suva8 Sonrasz Ortamznda 1947 Tiirkiye Iktisadi Kalkznma Planl 
(Ankara: Orta Dogu Teknik ~niversitesi, 1974) pp. 6- 10. 
investment could operate and invest in the specific sectors which were important for 
the economic development of the country. Foreigners, investing in these specific 
sectors gained the advantage to transfer profit and capital without having to apply for 
permission from the Ministry of Finance. With th~s  law, the government encouraged 
foreign investors to invest and operate in specific sectors. 
In 1950 the RPP, just before the Democrat Party (DP) came to power after 
the adoption of the multi-party system, enacted the frrst encouragement law of FDI; 
Law No. 5583.'"ith thls law the government extended the right of transfer to private 
companies, which borrowed from international markets. 
Although changes in the political and economic policies were initiated in the 
RPP period, the electoral victory of the DP was the major turning point for the 
economy. The DP put strong emphasis on aqculture and adopted liberal trade 
policies, whch made the importation of finished goods easier. These policies favored 
local merchants rather than large industrialists and it became attractive to import 
cornrnodlties from abroad for the domestic market and activities and most of the 
foreign firms preferred to export rather than having a foreign operation in Turkey 
under such circumstances. In the adoption of liberal trade policies the local merchants 
and large landowners played an important role and their power was relatively much 
hgher7'. 
What these improvements in the early 1950s suggest for the FDI is that a 
mixed economy whch gives the state a secondary role and the private sector the 
primary role requires external sources in order to sustain high economic growth rates. 
In pursuit of this transformation, after 1950 the DP prepared laws encouragmg FDI to 
76 K. Gijymen and G. Tiiztin, "Foreign Capital in Turkey" in METU Studies in Development, no .11, 
1984, pp.60-6 1 .  
77 Serdar Turgut, Demokrat Parti Doneminde Tiirkiye Ekonomisi: Ekonomik Kalkrnma Siire~leri 
Uzerine bir Deneme, (Ankara: Adalet Matbaac~hk, 199 1) pp. 140- 144. 
increase the inflow of FDI into the country. Although the experts of the World Bank 
were pleased about the encouragement Law No. 5583, enacted in 1950, the restrictions 
and the indefinite articles of FDI obstructed the inflow of higher amounts of FDI. To 
increase the inflow of FDI, a new encouragement law, Law No. 5821 was enacted on 
August 1, 1951. According to this law, foreign capital should meet some criteria: it was 
to promote the economic development of Turkey, and operate in a field open to 
foreign capital. 
T h s  law brought new arrangements to the transfer of profit. Accordmg to the 
new arrangements, foreign investors were allowed to a partial transfer of profits, 
lvidends and interests, whch were not to exceed ten percent of the foreign capital 
brought in. If the profit exceeded ten percent of capital, the excess was to be added to 
the next year's transfers. With Law No. 5821, foreign investors were granted all of the 
rights, fachties and exemptions extended to local investors. 
In this period Turkish economy enjoyed hgh economic growth rates. 
Between 1946 and 1954 GNP increased by an average annual rate of 9%. Especially, 
after 1950 the DP put strong emphasis on agricultural development and used the 
Marshall Plan aid to finance the import of agricultural machinery and expand the area 
under cultivation. Tractor use increased from 9,170 in 1949 to 35,000 in 1953 and 
reached to 42,136 by the end of the de~ade'~. Owing to the favorable weather 
conltions and international economic conjuncture because of the Korean War and 
strong emphasis of the DP on agricultural development, the increase of agricultural 
production reached to 11%. The share of agriculture in GNP increased from 43.6% in 
1946 to 44.7% in 1953 while the share of industry decreased from 15.2% to 13.4%'~. 
- - - - - -- 
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Although the share of industrial sector in GNP decreased, there were sipficant 
improvements in this sector in this period. Industrialization attempts encouraged by 
the Turkish Industrial Development Bank (Tiirk Smai ve Kalkmma Bankasi), created in 
the 1950 by the RPP, that extended long and medium term c re l t  to the manufacturing 
sector. TIDB credits were instrumental in the development of some of the prominent 
industrial enterprises in the 1950s.~" Nearly all of the big business established in this 
period obtained credits of the TIDB." As a result, owing to the availabihty of funds, 
relaxation of import restrictions and accessible foreign exchange, industrial production 
reached to 9% of GNP at that period. 82 
However, these golden years l d  not last very long. The favorable 
conjuncture disappeared in 1953. After the end of the Korean War international 
demand for export commodities slackened and the favorable weather conditions 
disappeared. Under such circumstances exports declined and foreign exchange reserves 
were depleted under the liberalized import regime. At the end of the 1953 the country 
experienced balance of payment crisis which is characterized by shortages of many 
items of basic fmal goods. Most of the foreign f m s ,  operating in Turkey, had 
increasing d~fficulty in obtaining foreign exchange to pay their parent company for 
purchases of inputs and to transfer profit in this period. Hence, especially in 1953 and 
1954 shortages of foreign exchange obstructed the hgher amounts of the FDI flow 
into Turkey. 
After 1954, a shift to the IS1 strategy arose out of necessity as a result of the 
balance of payments crisis. Until the 1960s' Turkey's experience with import 
substitution had been limited to the accidental beginnings triggered by foreign 
80 Ayge Bugra, State and Business in Modern Turkey A Comparative Stu&. New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1994. p. 122. 
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exchange shortages of the 1950s. Owing to the foreign exchange crisis, to drminish the 
dependence on foreign exchange tariff rates were increased and the importation of 
finished goods was restricted. High tariff rates accompanied by government 
restrictions on importation created favorable con&tions for domestic producers in the 
capital accumulation process. Domestic producers enjoyed high profit rates under the 
conditions where they were protected by the state from international c~mpetition.~" 
The state did not support the local firms only by increasing the tariff rates and 
restricting the importation of finished goods, but also concentrated on the production 
of intermediary goods to supply cheap inputs for the private sector. 
On January 18, 1954, the government enacted a new Foreign Investment 
Encouragement Law, No. 6224, superseded Law No. 5821 that was not attractive 
enough increasing the inflow of FDI. By doing this, the DP aimed, first, to decrease 
the balance of payments deficits and second, as the foreign exchange crises made it 
difficult for local firms to export commodities that are not produced locally, the 
government, by enacting Law No. 6224, intended to increase manufacturing activities 
of foreign firms. The latter is important in the development of the large industrial 
groups. Most of the local merchants, distributors of foreign companies, became 
producer of those certain commodities after the foreign exchange crisis. Law No. 
6224 brought very liberal provisions. It abolished restrictions on the transfers of 
profits, dividends and interest to ten percent of the capital as well as the restriction of 
foreign investment in certain specified areas of economic activity. The main 
requirements of Law No. 6224 were that foreign investment contributes to the 
economic development of Turkey that it should be in a field of activity open to 
86 Sevket Pamuk and Caglar Keyder, "Tlirkiye'de Rantlarin Ekonomi Politigi", Milliyet, 12 Aral~k 
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Turlush private enterprise and that foreign investment should not entail any monopoly 
or any special concessions. 
The provisions of Law No. 6224 seem liberal and compare favorably with 
the investment laws of many countries. However, between 1951 and 1980, $230 
d o n s  of total capital came through this channel.83 Since its inception in 1954, the 
flow of private capital into Turkey remained far below expectations. The ratio of 
realized investment of the authorized investment was only 30.7O/o between 1951 and 
1965. 
From 1950 onwards, foreign direct investment entered into Turkey 
accordmg to four main categories. These were 1) Laws No. 5821 and No. 6224; 2) the 
Turkish Industrial Development Bank, established with the aid of the International 
Bank of Recovery and Development in 1950 to provide long-term credit for private 
enterprise as well as to encourage private investments. 3) Petroleum Law No. 6326, 
which was enacted on March 18, 1954 and featured liberal provisions; and 4) Special 
Law No. 7462 about the Eregli Iron and Steel Factory, enacted in 1960. The private 
foreign investment, which came to Turkey through h s  channel, was significant 
relative to others. 
As mentioned before the role of the TIDB credits was sipficant especially 
in the 1950s. One of the largest and important industrial ventures of the Sabancl 
Group, the BOSSA textile factory established on the basis of credts obtained from the 
Turkish Industrial Development Bank.84 Also receiving the industrial credit from the 
Turlush Bank for Industrial Development was a turning point in Ecaaclbagl Group's 
business career, one (of the most successful business companies in Turkey) in 1950. 
83 As~m Erdilek, "Turkey's New Open Door Policy of Direct Foreign Investment: A Critical 
Analysis of Problems and Prospects", M E W  Sttrdies in Development no.13 (1986). 
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Nejat Eczaciba~i, the founder, was among the first entrepreneurs who applied to the 
Bank for industrial credit. He wanted to build a factory producing drugs under foreign 
license and the factory started production in 1 9 5 0 . ~ ~  
In the second half of the 1950s, as the favorable conjuncture for exporting 
disappeared, under protectionist condtions, foreign firms decided to invest rather than 
export certain products to Turkey. By collaborating with local firms, foreign firms 
began to manufacture their products in Turkey. This cooperation strengthened the 
transformation of local merchants into industrialists. As ISmeger writes, "the traders 
whose business was to import and resell consumer goods lost out to the industrialists 
who started factories to take advantage of import prohibitions".87 These importers 
commonly lacked the know-how required for successful local firms. Consequently, 
they asked the foreign firms whose products they distributed to start joint ventures 
with them.88 Working as the representative agency of a foreign exporter to Turkey is an 
important step in the business careers of some prominent Turhsh businessmen. Joint 
ventures with foreign firms also appear to be important for some well-known Turlush 
businessmen in their entry into the industrial sector. By Buj$a7s own words: "At a 
more general level, one could suggest that, in a late industriahation country which 
professes a commitment to the objective of Westernization, in a country where 
technology is important and, along with it, new needs are created, some knowledge of 
foreign production processes and markets naturally appears as a business asset of 
significance. Hence, in Turkey, entrepreneurs who possessed such knowledge have 
entered the business scene with an initial 
85 Bugra, p.87. 
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What this thesis suggests is that the contribution of FDI was sipficant in 
the transformation of local merchants into industrial entrepreneurs. According to 
Eralp foreign encouragement laws coincided with the period when the local 
bourgeoisie was attempting to collaborate with the ~ ~ ~ s . " ~ o r e i ~ n  fi ms and state 
enterprises facilitated the industriahation process and there was a direct relationship 
between the transformation process. 
Local merchants deahg  with the importation of finished goods became 
producers of certain goods instead of importing them, in this period." For instance, 
the Koq Group, one of the most significant business companies in Turkey, owing to 
the long-lasting foreign shortages in the 1950s started with the assembly production of 
the goods which were imported before. The company decided to build a factory for 
the assembly production of Ford vehicles." Bernar Nahum, a shareholding manager of 
KO$ explained that Vehbi Koq, the founder of the holdmg, convinced the necessity of 
industriahation in Turkey due to the lack of foreign exchange, the import limitations 
of the government." Many well-known industrial groups such as Borusan, Tekfen, 
Enka, E.C.A, Profdo, STFA, Alarko and Altmylldn established in the 1950s and most 
of them cooperated with foreign f m s  in thls pcriod.94 
Actually, it can be considered that the entrance of FDI into the host country 
may act as an obstacle for the operations of local f m s .  Yet in Turkey, the local 
entrepreneurs wanted to collaborate with FDI in order to acquire technological 
90 Atilla Eralp, "Tiirkiye'de Izlenen ithal ikameci Kalk~nma Stratejisi ve Yabanci Sermaye" in 
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94 Dogan Avc~oglu, Tiirkiye'nin Dilzeni (Ankara: Bjlgi Yay~nevi, 1968) pp. 358-385. 
knowledge and management skills." In other words there was collaboration rather 
than competition between the MNCs and large local f m s .  This collaboration enabled 
the entrance of local entrepreneurs in many sectors without having enough 
technological knowledge and management skills. In this way, foreign firms, instead of 
exporting their products, entered Turkey and collaborated with local entrepreneurs to 
realize the production of their commodities. As was the case in the Brazilian, the small- 
scale local firms couldn't compete with or collaborate with foreign firms and they 
stopped production in some cases. For instance, in the pharmaceutical sector, foreign 
firms dsplaced the small-scale firms in 1970. Another important point was that most 
of the firms intended to collaborate with foreign f m s  in almost every kind of 
production. Some scholars argue that in some specific areas local firms realized the 
investment with their own resources, but most preferred to collaborate with foreign 
firms." This situation can also be explained by the strong demand of local 
entrepreneurs for foreign firms to bring managerial skills and technological knowledge 
with them. 
Hence, it would be not wrong to argue that although the amount of the 
inflow of FDI into Turkey was insignificant statistically, the contribution of FDI in the 
transformation of local merchants into industrialists and in the industrialization 
process was essential and that there was collaboration between foreign f m s  with local 
entrepreneurs rather than competition. 
Although the trade barriers, the protectionist policies adopted by the 
government and encouragement Law No. 6224 regarding FDI were favorable for 
foreign companies to invest in Turkey, the increase in the inflow of FDI was not as 
95 Tlirkiye Sanayi Kongresi Tebligleri, "Tiirkiye'de Slnai Yatlrlmlarda Yabanc~ Sermaye" (1968), 
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great as expected between 1954 and 1960. This can be explained by the economic 
instability, especially between 1954 and 1958. Turkey was unable to borrow from 
abroad and external pressures and political unrest forced the DP to announce a 
stabilization programme in August 1958. The programme included moderation on 
government expenditures and a de facto develuation. As seen in Figure 1, the amount 
of realized FDI decreased in 1957 compared to the previous years as a result of 
expectations of a devaluation and economic instability. For instance the regonal 
manager for Southern Europe and the Near East of the Alpha Petroleum Company 
was considering Alpha's position in Turkey due to Tiirk Alfa A.5. was having 
increasing difficulty in obtaining dollars to pay its parent company for purchases of 
refined oil products, whch it marketed in ~urkey." At the end, the managers thought 
that if Alpha were to pull out of Turkey it would lose its present crude supply position 
in the rapidly growing Turkish market and continued its activitiesag8 
In the 1960s both authorized and realized foreign investments were below 
the levels expected by the Turkish government. This fact can be strengthened by 
reference to the proposed first five-year development plan about foreign duect 
investment. The five-year development plan forecasted the need of $50 million per 
annurn since the bepn ing  of the plan in 1963. As can be seen in Figure 1, authorized 
97 D. Richard Robinson, Cases in International Business. New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1962 
g.65. 
Ibid., p.69. 
Figure 1 Authorized and Realized FDI in Turkey between 1950 and 1974 ( $ 1000 ) 
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Figure 2 Authorized and Realized FDI in Turkey between 1954 and 1974 
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investment had not reached the $50 million level since 1951. When the realized 
investment is considered, the situation was worse than the authorized investment. 
In 1960 with the d t a r y  coup, the new r e p e  sought to quicken the pace of 
development. To the officers of the new regime planning was the single efficient way 
of acheving development. The new r e p e  differed from that of the DP in important 
respect: its reliance on state plans and the officers institutionalized IS1 as the official 
development strategy." With the establishment of the State Planning Organization 
(SPO) after the May 1960 coup the idea of development planning was admired. The 
bureaucracy, the MNCs and the large industrialists mostly shared this idea. The 
development plans of the SPO were based on long-term models rather than short- 
term policies and were obligatory for the public sector and only problem solving for 
the private sector. They maintained the coordmation between economic sectors and 
agents, strengthened economic growth and economic stabhty, and encouraged the 
inflow of foreign investment. 
In the first development plan, the balance of payments effect received focus 
rather than the technological and employment effects of FDI.'"" Plus, in thls plan, for 
the first time the problem of low realized investments was mentioned. Foreign 
companies were not obliged to realize investment immediately following the granting 
of investment permission. They could realtze investments whenever they wanted. 
Actually, many firms had preferred to wait for some years to invest in Turkey because 
of political instabihty. In this way they had the chance to invest under conditions 
99 Henri J. Barkey, The State and the industrialization Crisis in Turkey (Colorado: Westview Press 
1990), p.66. 
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suitable for investment. With foreign investors having investment permission, they 
made it difficult for domestic firms and other foreign investors to get approval for 
investments in the same area. This situation also blocked the entrance of other foreign 
companies willing to invest at that time and created and strengthened the oligopoly 
conditions in Turkish economy. 
The SPO noticed this ddernma and decided to cancel the investment 
permissions of foreign companies if the investments were not realized after a certain 
period. In other words, all authorized investments had to be implemented within 
specific time periods, which were contained in their decrees and the Turlush 
government canceled unimplemented decrees. 
One of the problems was about the article of Law No. 6224, concerning the 
contribution of FDI to the economic development of the country. According to Law 
No. 6224, foreign companies could realize investment in all sectors of the economy, 
provided it aided the country's economic development. It was not clear, however, how 
h s  was to be determined. Many representatives of foreign companies claimed that the 
SPO used this provision as a tool to drscrirninate against MNCs. In the &st 
development plan, the SPO also tried to clarify the concept of "beneficial for the 
country's economic development". "" 
In the second development plan, the technological contribution of MNCs 
was stated. It was because many questions and debates had arisen in the public about 
the contribution of MNCs to the economy. Some of the scholars questioned the 
technological, and employment effects of FDI on the country. Most of them reached 
the conclusion that many FDI projects, in the past, whch had been accepted without 
negotiating, had led to substantial losses for Turkey. Plus, the contribution of the 
lo' Erdilek, Dimt Fore@ Inuestment in Tn~kisb Man.factnn'ng. p. 27. 
MNCs to economic growth, and technological improvement was much below the 
levels that were expected.'02 Hence, in the second development plan the emphasis was 
gven to the technological contribution of the FDI to the country rather than the 
balance of payment effect. 
Especially in the 196Os, a sipficant increase in real wages created a 
substantial demand for domestic comrnolties and the growth of the domestic market 
encouraged the inflow of FDI to Turkey. In this period, called as the golden period of 
ISI, the economic growth rate was seven percent and the manufacturing sector's 
growth rate was between eleven and twelve percent.1o3 
The 1970s witnessed several economic and political instabilities in both 
Turkey and in the world. In developing countries, the easy stage of IS1 came to an end 
and the foreign exchange crisis and increasing dependency of imports led them to shift 
towards export promotion. Plus, most of the developed and developing countries 
negatively affected from the 1974 oil crisis. However, owing to the remittances sent by 
workers in Europe, with the support of the foreign exchange reserves and an 
accommodating monetary policy, Turkey did not simultaneously experience the 
negative impacts of the oil crisis with other countries in 1974 and the growth rate of 
the economy reached to 8.9 percent in 1975 and 1976."'~ Yet, borrowing abroad and 
expansionary policies only delayed the crisis. In 1978 and 1979 Turkey found itself in 
its most severe balance of payments ~risis."'~ 
In the 1970s firms containing foreign capital faced with two main issues in 
Turkey. First, the scarcity of foreign exchange, especially after 1976, obstructed 
transferring profits and obtaining imported inputs. In the 1970s, the inputs of the 
'O' Giilten Kazgan, Cumhuriyet, 18 Agustos 1967. 
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MNCs, as well as domestic companies, mostly relied on imported intermediary and 
capital goods. On the other hand there was a scarcity of foreign exchange owing to the 
overvalued Turkish Lira and the governments took over the allocation of the scarce 
foreign exchange. Hence, firms containing foreign capital had difficulties in obtaining 
foreign exchange. 
Second, the economic and political instability in the 1970s led foreign firms to 
be act prudently. Obviously, although Law 6224 remained effect, the attitudes of 
governments towards FDI changed in the 1970s. This change was mostly due to the 
firms containing foreign capital &d not fulfd the export requirements. The officers of 
SPO and the governments often influenced the necessity of export contribution of 
foreign firms. In addition the ideological thoughts and attitudes that were dominant in 
the political atmosphere were also significant affecting the activities and investment of 
foreign firms. 
To be more specific, it would be better to clarify the attitude of the 
governments towards FDI in Turkey. In 1971 there was a sudden change in the 
political life in Turkey and a non-party govemment under the premiership of Nihat 
Erim came in to power in March 1971. The new measures (affecting FDI) introduced 
by the new government indicated a shift from the liberal foreign investment policy. 
The new government announced that future applications for FDI would be judged on 
the following bases: provision for majority Turlush ownership; capacity for export; 
ability to induce an inflow of technology; and utilization of economies of s~ale."'~ In 
reality, the demands of the Turkish governments had not been met by the MNCs. The 
Turlush government's demand for increases in export commitments increases in local 
content and restrictions on the local credits available to FDI f m s  were harshly 
'06 Ashkin, p. 19. 
criticized by the MNCs operating in Turkey. They found the Turkish government's 
demands irrational."" As it is considered from a theoretical perspective, the 
commitments of Turkish government are what the bargaining school suggests. As 
mentioned before the Bargaining school suggests that technology is what the 
multinationals have and what the late developing countries want. For h s  purpose, 
especially in the 1970s, host countries put pressure on MNCs to bring their technology 
with them and the MNCs were duected to export-oriented sectors. For instance some 
of the Latin American countries and India gained bargaining power over the MNCs by 
controlling capital and access to its markets and directed them for their favor in the 
1970s. On the other hand the MNCs did not want to share their technological 
advantage whlch brings with it high profit rates. Although Brazil was successful at 
directing the MNCs to the manufacturing sector because of its control over the access 
to its markets and resources, it cbd not gain the same success when trying to direct 
MNCs in the pharmacy sector; due to the MNCs bargammg power was stronger than 
the bargaining power of the Brazilian government in the pharmaceutical sector. 
However, the bargaining strategy of the Turkish government and the SPO was 
not as successful as that utilized in Latin America. The reasons will be discussed in the 
next chapters. 
Eventually foreign b s  quickly affected from the new improvements and 
the regulations of the Turkish governments. FDI entered into Turkey decreased from 
$12 million in 1972 to $1.8 d o n  in 1974 and fluctuated during the period 1975-1979. 
Finally $9 million dollars of FDI left Turkey in 1979."'~ 
lo' Erdilek, Direct Foreign Investment in Turkish Man.fa~%uring p.22. 
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In sum, the foreign exchange crisis experienced in the second half of the 
1970s had a great impact on the MNCs operating in Turkey. They had trouble getting 
the foreign exchange to transfer to their corporate headquarters. In addition the 
foreign exchange crisis, the bargaining policies of the governments, and the economic 
and politic instability in the country, obstructed the higher level of FDI flow into 
Turkey. 
CHAPTER 6 
FDI IN THE TURKISH ECONOMY 
This study is lunited to the analysis of the foreign direct investment entered 
to Turkey by Laws No. 5821 and 6224. As mentioned before, although it had highly 
liberal provisions, Law No. 6224 proved unable to attract the hlgh flow of foreign 
investment to the country. In the next section, this issue will be discussed at greater 
length. In this section FDI movements and the impact of foreign drrect investment on 
the economy wdl be studed. 
Table 4 The Distribution of Firms Containing Foreign Capital 
According to S~ecific Fields- 1977 
Fields Number of Firms 
Chemicals 
Electrical Machines 
Food and beverage 
Vehicles 
Tourism 
Machinery 
Mining 
Agriculture 
Source: Uras 1979, p. 146. 
106 firms containing foreign capital were operating in the Turkish economy 
in 1976. This amount began to decrease slightly after that year. By the end of 1977 the 
number of firms with foreign capital was 99. 86 of these firms were operating in the 
manufacturing sector. 11 firms were operating in the service sector, one in mining, and 
one in agriculture. In 1977 88.3% of FDI was concentrated in the manufacturing 
sector. In 1979, the number of firms decreased to 91, and in 1980, showing a 
significant increase, the number of firms with foreign capital reached 100."'" 
In 1977, in 46 of these firms, the foreign capital share was below fifty 
percent. In 53 firms, the share of foreign capital was over fifty percent. When 
considering these numbers, the measure taken by the government regardmg the share 
of the foreign capital in firms should be taken account. 12 firms contained one 
hundred percent foreign capital and most of them were concentrated in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Some of the important f m s  containing foreign capital were 
Akdeniz Fertilizer Industry Corporation (share of foreign capital: 40°) ,  Oyak - 
Renault Automobile Factory Corporation (share of foreign capital: 44%), Tofag 
Turkish Automobile Factory Corporation (share of foreign capital: 41.5%), and 
Anadolu Glass Industry Corporation ( share of foreign capital: 13.1°/o). 
Table 5 Distribution of Foreign Investment in Turkey According to Industries (by the end 
of 1965 - 1,000$) 
- - - - - - -- - - - 
Machinery Cash Others Total % of total 
Sectors and Equipment capital 
Agriculture 140,9 140,9 0.2 1 
Mining 228,4 627,9 856,3 1.25 
Manufacturing 39,058 23,248 3,076 65,383 95.2 
Building 135,4 494,6 630,l 0.92 
Services 102,4 1,505 1607,7 2.34 
TOTAL 39,665 25,876 3,076 68,6 18 100 
Source: Records of the Ministry of Trade, in Tuncer, p.87. in Ashkin p.88. 
As mentioned before, MNCs mostly invested in the manufacturing industry 
especially between 1950 and 1980 in developing and developed countries. In Turkey, 
hke in other countries, operations of forelgn firms mostly concentrated in the 
109 Taner Berksoy, Suut A.Dogrue1, and Fatma Dogruel, Tiirkiye 'de Yabancr Sermaye (Istanbul: 
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manufacturing industry. As seen in the Table 5, 95.2% of FDI was concentrated in 
manufacturing industry in Turkey in 1965. In the end of the 1970s this ratio decreased 
to 85 %. Although there were ardent discussions in the parliament about encouraging 
FDI in the agricultural sector"", foreign firms did not prefer to invest in this sector. 
0.21% of total foreign capital invested in the agricultural sector in 1965. The share of 
service sector was also insignificant. Roughly 2.5% of total foreign capital invested in 
the service sector. However, owing to the changes in the international economic 
conjuncture and the economic policies of the Turkish governments the share of 
service sector began to increase appreciably after 1980. 
Table 6 Production Effect of Foreign Direct Investments (manufacturing- million TL) 
Years Realized Production Contribution YO YO 
production of private of F.D.1 to (311) (312) 
sector production 
1961 17,496 1 1,258 800 4.58 7.1 1 
1962 19,439 12,209 603 3.10 4.91 
1963 20,084 12,464 963 4.80 7.73 
1964 24,368 14,996 1,248 5.12 8.32 
Average 4.44 7.10 
Source: Tuncer p. 99. 
The contribution of FDI to production in Turkey can be studled by analyzing 
the manufacturing industry. This is because ninety-five percent of FDI was 
concentrated in manufacturing activities and the inadequacy of confident data about 
the other sectors. The contribution of foreign investment to production was calculated 
by using the data of a questionnaire conducted by the SPO and foreign companies. 
The results of the questionnaire give some information about the sales amounts of 
110 Giingor Uras, Tiirklye'a'e Yabann Semuye Yatznmlan. ~stanbul: Formiil Matbaasl, 1979. 
pp. 126-132 
foreign companies. For instance, in 1964, the share of foreign capital was 5.12% of 
total production and 8.32% of the private sector's production in 1964. 
The Effects of FDI on the Turkish Economy 
In 1973 the share of firms containing foreign capital was 10.38% of total 
sales in the manufacturing sector. T h s  ratio was 10.02% in 1975 and 10.27% in 1976. 
The share of FDI in the GNP was 1.4 %. For the sake of comparison, in Brazil this 
ratio was 8.3 %."' 
Table 7 The Share of FDI in the GNP of Some Developing Countries- 1975 
(Percentage as $US millions) 
Country GNP % FDI in GNP 
Greece 
TURKEY 
Egypt 
Nigeria 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Source: Drawn from Karluk, p.2 1 1. 
As seen in Table 7, the share of FDI in GNP was 1.4% in 1975. When 
compared with other developing countries, this ratio is insignificant. For instance, in 
Brazil, the share of FDI in GNP was 8.3% and in Mexico it was 7.6% in 1975. 
Although the size of the Greek market was smaller than the Turlush market the share 
of FDI in Greek economy was 3.1%. However, it should be mentioned that, aids and 
economic policies of the European Union played an important role in the Greek 
economy. There are simdarities between the attitudes of government in Greece and 
111 S. Ridvan Karluk, Tiirkiye 'de Yabancl Sermaye Yatlrcmlarl (Istanbul: 1stanbul Ticaret 
Odasi, 1982), p.2 1 1. 
Turkey. In Greece, similar in Turkey, the government tried to increase the inflow of 
FDI by regulating the liberal encouragement law of FDI in the 1950s. Insufficient 
industrial capital, political and economic instabihty, and inadequate infrastructure were 
the problems facing the Greek economy in the first half of the 1950s. The Greek 
authorities considered that if foreign firms were encouraged to invest in Greece that 
would create employment opportunities, limiting imports and accelerating the 
country's economic development. Although The Greek government restricted the 
transfer of profit if it was over ten percent of the capital, in many ways, gave privileges 
to the foreign firms. FDI as a percentage of total capital formation in the Greek 
economy was running at 2.4% per annum at 1975 prices.112 
The Employment effect FDI and Shares of Foreign Firms in Total Sales 
As mentioned before, MNCs heavily invested in the manufacturing sector in 
developing countries. Turkey was not an exception. In Turkey between 1950 and 1980 
most of the MNCs concentrated in the manufacturing sector. After 1980 the relative 
importance of service sector increased. Table 8 suggests that forelgn capital was 
concentrated in five main sectors: automotive, pharmaceutical and chemicals, electrical 
machines and tools, food and beverage, and rubber in manufacturing industry. Firms 
containing foreign capital have a share of 56.2% of total sales in vehicle sector. Their 
share is 58% in rubber sector and 52.8% in electrical machines. Although it had the 
second hlghest sales amount, the textile sector was not attractive to foreign f m s  
because of a comparative disadvantage. The share of firms containing foreign capital in 
total sales is 0.5% in textile sector. This indcator shows that, as Hymer points out, 
112 Petrochilos, p.69. 
MNCs  invest in the sectors in which they have the comparative advantages over the 
local firms. In addition, especially European and U.S. firms invest in the capital- 
intensive sectors. Hence, it can be  suggested that MNCs mostly concentrated in the 
sectors, which required management skills and high technology. 
Table 8 Share of Firms Containing Foreign Capital in Total Sales and Employment in 
Manufacturing Industry (millions dollars) -1976 
Total Firms Firms Containing Foreign Capital 
Sector 
Food and Beverage 
Textile and Clothing 
Paper 
Rubber 
Plastic engrave 
Chemicals 
Glass 
Vehicles 
Mineral Goods 
Machines 
Agricultural Machines 
Electrical Machines 
Others 
TOTAL 12.805 737.919 1.672 13 43.950 5 
Note: 1$=16.66 taken by 1976. Calculated and organized using the FDI reports of Ministry of 
Commerce ( 1  976) and Uras (1 979) p. 194 
The Employment and Efficiency Effect of FDI 
As mentioned before, owing to the high unemployment rates and the need to 
create employment in order to sustain a higher economic growth rate, developing 
countries encourage the investments of foreign firms. These countries expect from the 
FDI creating new job opportunities and introducing management skills. However, the 
statistics and the activities of MNCs bring out that most of the MNCs invested on the 
capital-intensive sectors rather than labor-intensive sectors and by and large they 
employed skilled labor. This situation was similar in Turkey especially between 1950 
and 1980. 
Table 8 is a good example supporting the statement above. As shown in 
Table 8 foreign firms employed 5% of total workers in Turkey. This ratio is as 
insignificant as the other indicators. 
The statement above, about the concentration of MNCs in capital-intensive 
sectors can be strengthened by Table 9. 
Table 9 Production Value of Per Worker - 1973 
Firms (TLIPer Worker) 
Foreign Firms 3 14,572 
Private Sector (manufacturing) 190,019 
Source: Uras, p.208. 
Table 9 suggests that the efficiency of per worker is higher in the foreign firms 
when compared to local firms. As the unit of capital is increased, then the efficiency of 
per worker increases. Therefore, according to Table 9, it can be argued that foreign 
investment was concentrated in capital-intensive sectors. 
Table 10 strengthens that the employment effect of foreign f m s  is trivial. 
Employment created by foreign investment was insignificant when total employment 
and private employment levels were considered. The ratios of contribution of FDI are 
3.21% when private sector considered only, and 1.91 when public and private sector 
both considered. 
Table 10 Number of Workers in Manufacturing Industry-1965 
Total Number of Workers in Number of Workers % YO 
(Public+Private) Private sector in F.D.1 (311) (312) 
Source; Tuncer 1968, p. 1 16. 
Dependency of Foreign Firms on Inputs Imported 
One of the important contributions expected from the FDI was an increase 
in the amount of foreign exchange in the country. As the foreign firms decided to 
invest in the country, it is expected that, they wfl gradually bring foreign exchange with 
them. However, in Turkey, most of the MNCs borrowed from internal sources or 
obtained credts from the Cooley fund whch was formed by the U.S.A. in order to 
support the U.S. firms operating in Turkey. By this way, U.S. firms could easily 
borrowed credits as Turkish currency rather than foreign exchange. Furthermore, the 
statistics suggest that most of the MNCs brought machinery and equipment with them 
rather than bringing cash. 
The statistics show that, MNCs, lrke many local firms, depended on input 
imported rather than using internal hkages. Especially, in the second half of the 
196Os, the easy stage of IS1 came to an end and producers became more dependent on 
foreign exchange as they began to produce intermediary and capital goods. According 
to Table 11 the ratio of the dependency of foreign firms on inputs imported in 
manufacturing industry was 52.5%. Most of the foreign firms obtained the main parts 
of the product from their home countries. This situation was criticized and called 
montaj s a n e  (assembly industry), which referred to the import of at least % of the 
product to be assembled in the host country. 
Table 11 Dependency of Foreign Firms on Inputs Imported (millions dollars)-1975 
Total Input Imported Input Dependency on Imports % 
Manufacturing Industry 
Food and beverage 
Textile and Clothing 
Paper 
Rubber 
Plastic engrave 
Chemicals 
Glass 
Vehicles 
Mineral goods 
Machines 
Agricultural machines 
Electrical machines 
Others 
Note: 1 $=15. 15 taken by the 1975 rate 
Source: Own calculation fiom Uras (1979) p.269 
As seen in Table 12, the imports of foreign firms depended mostly on 
intermediary and capital goods. This can be explained by the inadequacy of local 
producers in producing commodities which require technology, management skill, and 
economies of scale. This picture also shows the failure of the IS1 strategy in Turkey as 
the firms became more dependent on foreign inputs in the later steps of the model. 
Table 12 Exports and Imports of Firms Containing Foreign Capital 1970 ($ m) 
Exoortd 1 Imaorts(2) f 1 ) - (2) Deficit 
Final Goods Sect 11.8 6.5 5.3 
Intermediary Goods Sector 9.6 100.0 - 90.4 
Capital Goods Sector 3.8 182.6 - 178.8 
TOTAL 25.2 289.1 - 263.9 
Source: Alpar, p. 178. 
The Export Contribution of Foreign Firms to the Turkish Economy 
As mentioned before, one of the expected contributions from MNCs is to 
increase their exportation. Especially in the 1970s, the Turkish governments started to 
bargain with the MNCs and attempted to direct them to the export-oriented sectors. 
However, many foreign f m s  found the implementations irrational and abandoned 
their investment decisions. As seen from the Table 13, the implementations of the 
governments did not increase the amount of exports in terms of the total sales of 
foreign firms. In the manufacturing industry, in which MNCs heavily invested, exports 
of firms containing foreign capital were 2.8% of their total sales in 1973, 3.1% in 1975 
and 2.7% in 1976. The amount of exports done by foreign firms was insignificant. 
Table 13 Exports of Firms Containing Foreign Capital in Total Sales 
(as percentage) 
Sectors Exports/Total Sales of Foreign Firms 
1973 1975 1976 
Manufacturing 
Mining 
Agriculture 
Services 
TOTAL 3.3 3.6 3.3 
Source: Uras 1979, p.214. 
The Effects of Taxes Paid by Foreign Firms on the Turkish Economy 
In general, when the total tax revenues are considered the contributions of 
foreign firms are insipficant. One reason for this situation is, foreign firms would be 
taxed twice on their incomes, and host countries generally keep the tax levels of 
foreign firms lower than the domestic producers. However, the tax ratio o f  the 
production tax and duty tax are the same for both foreign and  local firms. 
Table 14 Tax Payments of F.D.1 in Total Tax Revenues of State (Thousand TL) 
Total Tax Revenues Tax payments of F.D.1 
(income+corporation+ (income+corporation 
tax from production) +tax from production) 
Source: Bulletin of State Incomes 1966, Ministry of Finance, in Tuncer, p.96 
Accordmg t o  Table 14, F D I  made u p  0.4'/0 o f  total taxes. This is an  important 
indicator, which shows that the contribution o f  F D I  t o  tax revenues was insignificant. 
To give a more  detailed example, it can b e  said that the payment o f  income taxes o f  
F D I  was 0.5% o f  total income taxes collected. 
Table 15 Share of Firms Containing Foreign Capital in Tax Revenues, 
in percentage 
1973 1975 1976 
Corporation Taxes 7.68 7.01 0.63 
Income taxes 0.60 0.54 0.63 
Financial balance tax 1.45 1.2 1 1.06 
Production tax 14.98 10.87 16.50 
Du tax 4 .02 
Source: Uras p.233. 
Although the contribution o f  firms containing forelgn capital was 
i n s i p f i c a n t  t o  tax revenues, there is an  exception for one  case. As  i t  is seen in the 
Table 15, foreign firms have a share o f  40% in total duty tax. T h e  state taxes the inputs 
imported from abroad and  the case above also strengthens the dependency o f  foreign 
firms o n  inputs imported. 
Transfer of the Profits 
As mentioned before the main motive of a firm to invest abroad is profit 
maximization. Firms, gradually, transfer some of their profits to home country or 
reinvest them. However, especially developing countries desire that the inflow of 
foreign capital exceeds the profits sent back abroad. 
Table 16 Comparison of the Transfers and Amount of FDI that Entered Turkey 
(thousand dollars) 1950-1975 
Realized FDI (I)  Income Transferred (2) (21 1) 
According to Law No. 6224 152,945 1 73,444 134 
According to Petroleum Law 136 * 
* It refers to the period 1963-1976. 
Source: Own calculation from Alpar, p. 17 1; Uras pp. 225 and 166. 
Table 16 suggests that the amount of the out flowing capital was quite larger than 
the inflow of capital in Turkey. In some of the Latin American countries the amount 
of out flowing capital was much higher than Turkey. In Latin American countries in 
this era the outflow of capital was much hlgher than the inflow of foreign capital. 
According to data from 1946 to 1967, the new entries of capital were 5,415 million 
dollars into Latin America and the sum of reinvested profits was 4,424 million dollars. 
And in this period, the ratio of remitted capital to new flow was around 2.7; for each 
dollar that entered $2.70 left.'13 
113 Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence" American Economic Review (May, 1970) 
p.23 1. 
Reasons for the Inadequate Flow of FDI 
As seen from the study above, the amount of FDI in Turkey was below the 
expected level. However, compared to other countries in the world, Turkey had a very 
liberal foreign encouragement law. As seen in Table 17, Turkey differed from other 
countries in encouragmg FDI. 
What can be understood by this fact is that there is no direct relationship 
between the regulations about FDI and the inflow of foreign capital. In other words, 
the inflow of foreign capital could not be increased only by liberal regulations alone. If 
the inflow of foreign capital is below the expected level, one should be looking 
elsewhere for the reason. 
Table 17 Selected Rules Affecting Affiliates of Foreign MNCs 
Country Ownership Profit Remittance Local Content 
- - - -  
Argentina Unrestricted 
Brazil de facto gov. Pressure 
for majority Brazilian 
ownership 
Mexico 49 % foreign is maximum 
Turkey unrestricted until 1972, 
after 1972,49% foreign 
is maximum 
supplementary tax on 
remittance above 12% 
of registered capital 
supplementary tax on 
remittance above 12% 
of registered capital 
unrestricted except by 
general exchange 
controls 
unrestricted 
- - 
80% require 
on autos 
on many products, 
over 90% on autos 
on many products; 
60% on autos 
Source: Oksay 1967 ; Grosse, from Business International Corporation, 1987. 
Accordmg to Table 17, only Turkish laws enabled the profit remittance without 
any restriction and did not require a ratio of local content in the production of forelgn 
firms. However,  as seen i n  Table 18, the annual average o f  FDI inflow to Brazil was 
1.8 billion dollars a n d  the amount  o f  FDI inflow in Turkey was 7.7 d o n  dollars. 
Table 18 Inflows of FDI to Major Recipient Countries in 
Latin America and Turkey 1970 - 1980 (US $ millions) 
Country Annual Averages 
1970-1974 1975-1979 
Brazil 85 1.9 1,820.3 
Mexico 413.1 791.3 
Argentina 10.2 119.6 
Turkey 4.7 7.7 
- 
Source: Uras p. 166; Grosse, p.56. 
T h e  Brazilian Case - a comparison 
O n e  o f  the interesting points is that, although Brazil and  Turkey are generally 
pu t  into the same category as LDCs,  or periphery countries, as the dependency school  
calls them, the amount  of FDI in Brazil has  been much  higher than in Turkey. 
Table 19 Foreign Capital Stock in Some Developing Countries (millions dollars) 
Countries 1973 
Argentina 2.5 
Brazil 7.5 
Mexico 3.1 
India 1.8 
South Africa 8.4 
TURKEY 0.4 
Source: Dogruel; Berksoy. 
Table 20 Crude Classification of the International System circa 1970 
Per Capita GNP Per Capita GNP 
Greater than $900 Less than $900 
- 
GNP greater U.S. 
than $100 billion U.S.S.R 
Japan China 
Germany (Fed. Rep.) 
France 
United Kingdom 
GNP 
between 
$30 billion 
and 
$100 billion 
GNP 
between 
$5 billion 
and 
$30 billion 
Italy 
Canada 
Germany (Dem. Rep) 
Poland 
Spain 
Sweden 
Czechoslovakia 
Australia 
Belgium 
Switzerland 
Denmark 
Romania 
Finland 
Norway 
Netherlands 
Hungary 
Greece 
Austria 
Argentina 
Venezuela 
Israel 
India 
BRAZIL 
MEXICO 
South Africa 
Yugoslavia 
Pakistan 
Iran 
TURKEY 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Egypt 
Philippines 
Chile 
Colombia 
Nigeria 
Taiwan 
Source: IBRD, 1973; Evans, p.293. 
Evans points to the data in Table 20 as a reference to show that Brazil hffers 
from T h d  World Countries, with a hlgher income. According to Evans, Brazil's 
"economic miracle" made it "the Latin American Darling of the International Business 
Community" and the Brazilian market was the sixth largest in the world in 1973 for 
American manufacturing affiliates. 'I4 Brazil was enjoying a growth rate of ten percent 
per year and the growth rate was even higher, particularly in certain sectors such as 
114 Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in 
Brazil (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p.33. 
automobiles in the 1970s."~ Hence, the growth of investments, sales and profits put 
Brazil into perspective as a potential location for foreign direct investment. Growth in 
itself was attractive, but also Brazil provided good rates of return as well as 
opportunities for rapid growth for foreign firms. One of the sudarities between two 
countries is that Brazil and Turkey adopted IS1 strategy in the same period. However, 
unlike Turkey, Brazil was able to transform its economic development strategy from 
IS1 to export-led growth when the inevitable crisis of IS1 emerged and, as a result, 
Brazil experienced an economic boom between 1966 and 1973."" 
Of course, the growth rate and goods rate of return were not the only 
incentives for foreign frrms to invest in Brazil. Its geographic location and its relations 
with center countries in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries also helped in its 
industrialization process. In the nineteenth century, there was a flow of an important 
amount of foreign capital, especially from Britain and European countries into Brazil. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, foreign investment was concentrated in natural- 
resource industries and public utilities (power generation, telephone and telegraph 
service). In this period, British entrepreneurs built local companies and hired local 
workers."' 
In the nineteenth century the concentration of foreign countries in the 
export-oriented sectors restricted the possibhty of industrial growth because it created 
a poor domestic market and it left a large surplus in the hands of foreign 
entrepreneurs. However, in this period, Brazil was more fortunate than many 
dependent nations. Its major export crop, coffee, was in the hands of local rather than 
115 Ibid., pp. 166- 167. 
116 Haldun Giilalp, "Tiirkiye'de ithal ikamesi Bunal~m~ ve Dqa Aqlma" in METUStudies in 
Development, no.7 (1 980), p.56. 
117 Robert Grosse, Multinationals in Latin America (London: Routledge,l989), p.9. 
foreign capital. The local ownershp of the plantations not only provided some degree 
of local autonomy, but more important, the possibility of local capital acc~rnulation."~ 
According to Cardoso, the difference of Brazil's position from that of the 
other LDCs in the twentieth century is explained by the term "dependent 
development". The dependent development, for Cardoso, is a special instance of 
dependency characterized by the association or alliance of international and local 
capital. The state also joins the alliance as an active partner, and the resulting triple 
alliance is a fundamental factor in the process of dependent development.""n other 
words, dependent development is based on the triple alliance of the multinationals, the 
state, and the local bourgeoisie. Comparing Turkey with Latin American countries 
Bugs emphasizes that "Although foreign direct investment has not traditionally played 
an important role in Turkish economy and, consequently, has not appeared as a factor 
which could significantly alter the nature of state-business relations as it has, for 
example, in the Latin American setting where foreign connections have played a non- 
negligible role in many business careers. Working as the representative agency of a 
foreign exporter to Turkey is an important step in the business careers of some 
prominent Turhsh businessmen. Joint ventures with foreign firms also appear to be 
important for some prominent Turkish businessmen in their entry into the industrial 
~ector".'~" 
According to Evans, dependent development, which brings a rapid economic 
growth rate with it, is not a phase that all countries are able to reach. Only a few are 
chosen.l2' Dependent development takes place in countries in which the local 
bourgeoisie and international capital can forge functioning alliance. These countries 
l IS Evans, pp.60-6 1. 
119 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Dependency and Development in Latin America" in The New Left 
Review (1972) pp. 83-95. 
lZ0 BuBa, p.67. 
121 Evans, p. 33. 
differ from the majority of Third World countries and Wallerstein refers them to semi- 
periphery. 
To reveal the difference of Brazil from Third World countries, Evans gives 
information about economic indicators. He states that in the case of steel, both India 
and Mexico, produced amounts in the same range as Brazil, but no other Third World 
country even comes close. Mexico and the Republic of South Korea both produce 
more synthetic fibers than Brazil, but in consumer durables like passenger cars and 
refrigerators not even Mexico is a close competitor. In 1974 when the Brazihan 
production of steel was 7.5 (million metric ton) it was 5.0 in Mexico and 6.6 in India. 
The production of steel was 1.5 ( d o n s  metric ton) in Turkey in 1976. Again, in 1974 
the production of passenger cars (including those assembled from imported parts) was 
562 (thousand unit) in Brazil, and only 63 (thousand unit) in Turkey by 1976.'" 
The Effect of the Bureaucracy and the State Planning Organization (SPO) 
Although Turkey had a very liberal foreign encouragement law (Law No. 
6224), the inflow of FDI was lower than the expected level. However, Article 1 of Law 
No. 6224 implied that FDI had to benefit the economic development of the country. 
This vague law over the years became open to use a tool for the bureaucracy and the 
government to &scriminate against some FDI activities. Hence, especially for the 
foreign f m s ,  the SPO and the red typing of public institutes were responsible for the 
low inflow of FDI. 
For instance, an entrepreneur, Alber Bilen who was the drugs producer 
Bohme Fettchemie's independent representative for the Middle East region, began to 
ibid., pp.297-298. 
explore the possibilities of local import substitution production under foreign license 
when the foreign exchange scarcity became relevant. Bu@a explains the controversy 
between the encouragement law of FDI and the attitude of the government toward 
foreign investment: "The joint venture was formed in a period when a very liberal 
foreign investment law was in application, and the attitude of the government in power 
was also very favorable toward joint ventures between Turkish and foreign firms. Yet, 
the implementation of the law was governed by a very pragmatic attitude which 
consistent in h t i n g  the period of the agreement with the objective of elirmnating the 
foreign partner as soon as the technological know-how was acquired and the firm was 
established on the market. This obvious tactic was, of course, well noticed by foreign 
investors who were driven away from the agreement as a consequence. There was, in 
other words, a clear dscrepancy between the law and its bureaucratic 
implementation"12' In a closed economy in which foreign economic relations are 
subject to extensive state control, each connections with foreigners also involves an 
encounter with the state a~th0r i ty . l~~ In addition many foreign investors accused the 
Turkish bureaucracy of straight and simple violation of the law for not implementing 
its various provisions. For instance, the bureaucracy did not allow the capitahation of 
intangible rights reduced and even stopped royalty payments.12' 
One of the important obstacles for foreign firms was the long waiting period 
to receive their permissions from the Council of Ministers. In the 1970s, the average 
time between a firm's application for permission and its publication in the Official 
Gazette was about two years.12%nother problem was the SPO's unwillingness to 
process the FDI applications quickly enough. The SPO often increased the red tape 
123 Bugra, p.9 1 .  
124 Ibid., p.69. 
125 Erdilek, Direct Foreign Investment in Turkish Manufactutitg p. 14. 
'26 Ibid., p. 24. 
for the application procedures for foreign firms so that permissions for foreign firms 
would be delayed at least for three or four months. The SPO officers denied that the 
SPO was anti-FDI and explained the delays with political facts and a shortage of 
expert personnel. The last fact was the main problem of the institutions, whch were 
responsible for evaluating FDI applications. For instance, there were only a few 
experts in the Ministry of Commerce's (MOC) FDI division and they were fired for 
political reasons when the new government came into power. Hence, with no skilled 
employees, as the chief of the MOC's FDI division stated, his division was no longer 
capable of evaluating the FDI applications on a technical 
The Single Agency Problem 
One of the facts affecting the FDI application process was the lack of a strong 
and efficient organization dealing with the FDI application process. Coordination was 
lacking between the institutions deahg  with FDI. The application procedure was 
complicated and required many steps before realtzing the investment. According to 
foreign encouragement Law No. 6224, first, the FDI application was submitted to the 
Ministry of Commerce. Then, if the application was in f u l f h e n t  of its requirements 
the MOC sent the application to the SPO (before the establishment of the SPO it had 
been the Committee of Encouragement of FDI). The SPO evaluated the net economic 
and technological benefits for the country within the framework of the development 
plans. If the evaluation of the SPO was favorable, then the application was sent back 
to the MOC. From there, a draft of the foreign firm application was sent by the MOC 
to the Council of Ministers (COM) for political approval. The draft had to be signed 
12' Ibid., p. 25. 
by all cabinet ministers before it could become fmalized. The final decree went into 
effect with its publication in the Official ~azette.'" 
With the 24 January 1980 program, a newly created Foreign Direct Investment 
Department, w i t h  the SPO, acquired the consolidated authority, which had been 
previously split among several hfferent government agencies to manage the relations 
with foreign 
The Foreign Exchange Crises 
Foreign exchange is important for foreign f m s  in two ways. First, business 
theory implies that the main motive for foreign investment is profit and foreign firms 
gradually want to transfer their profits to their home countries. Second, especially in 
the countries, whch have adopted the strategy of ISI, it is important for a foreign firm 
to obtain foreign exchange to get imported inputs. In these countries generally when 
the easy stage of IS1 come to an end, there emerges a scarcity of foreign exchange and 
the dependency of firms (including foreign firms) on imported inputs makes the scarce 
foreign exchange more important. In Turkey, there are specific examples of this 
phenomenon, whlch were experienced in the foreign exchange crises in 1954, 1958 
and in the second half of the 1970s."" 
128 Tuncer, p.77. 
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The Effect of Political and Economic Instability 
As mentioned above in the section on business theories of FDI, economic 
climate and political stabhty are important in the decision of foreign direct investment. 
Although the profit ratio is the main motive to invest abroad, under the conditions 
where the risk of investment is high, foreign firms would avoid realizing the 
investment abroad. 
In Turkey, the relationship can be seen clearly between the political and 
economic instabhty and the realized FDI. After 1957, the ratio of realized investment 
started to dimimsh. In 1957, the realized investment was 13.4% of the authorized 
investment; in 1958, this ratio decrease to 5.8%. This can be explained by the 
economic, political instabhty in 1956-7. Especially in 1957, although they received 
investment permission, the expectation of devaluation prevented foreign investors 
from investing in Turkey. Another example can be given by comparing the 1959 ratios 
with the 1960 ratios. In 1959, the realized investment was 8% of the authorized 
investment. In 1960 thls ratio sharply decreased to 0.5%. This can be explained by the 
military intervention. Therefore, it can easily be said that the economic and political 
clunate has a great influence on foreign direct investment activities. As seen in 1969, 
both the realized investment and the ratio of realized investment to authorized 
investment decreased sipficantly. This can also be explained by the expectation of 
devaluation. 
The Effect of Public Opinion 
Owing to the bitter experience with the capitulations in the nineteenth 
century in the Ottoman Empire, FDI has always been viewed as somewhat suspicious 
in Turkey. In the 1960s, many debates took place in the parliament and in the press. 
These were mostly about the improper functioning of the foreign frrms. For instance, 
one foreign firm, although it had taken the approval to produce the raw materials for 
pills, produced baby' s food, which was in no way related to the approved category.'31 
Other criticized subject was the insignificant contribution of the foreign f m s  to the 
Turkish economy. Most of the foreign f m s  assembled imported inputs. They were 
criticized for dlsregardmg the local content and increasing the dependency on foreign 
exchange. 
In the 1970s, although ideological attitudes were mostly in favor of FDI, 
government obstacles increased significantly. For instance, during the coalition 
governments, some decrees were blocked for more than a year because of the lack of 
one or two signatures. In addition, the competition between the political parties mostly 
increased employee circulation in the departments dealing with FDI and this 
diminished the number of skilled personnel in these departments. 
13 1 Uras, pp. 276-277. 
The Bargaining Process 
Especially in the 1970s, the SPO increased its negative behavior toward foreign 
firms. SPO officers explained this behavior with the bargaining process and stated that 
the SPO aimed to protect the nation's economic interests. However, this bargaining 
process was a little problematic. As mentioned before, after the second half of the 
1960s, in the development plans, the export contribution of FDI was stated. For 
instance, between 1973 and 1977 the government put the export commitment of five 
percent of the total production of FDI per year and it was difficult to realize this 
amount for many foreign In 1972, the Erim government decided to increase 
the share of local content in foreign firms. Also in the 1970s governments demanded 
that foreign f m s  bring technology with them into the Turkish economy. However, 
many foreign investors found the demands of the Turkish government for increases in 
export commitments and local content irrational. 
Contrary to Turkish experience, especially in the 1970s, some of the Latin 
American countries were successfully bargaining with the MNCs in certain areas. It 
would be interesting to examine how some Latin American countries were successful 
in the bargaining process to understand the failure of the Turkish governments. 
Since the independence of most Latin American countries in the early 1800s, 
governments have tightly controlled their economies. In the twentieth century most of 
them adopted Statism and established many state enterprises for the purpose of 
industrialization. However, this was not a "nationalistic movement" in the sense. In 
132 Uras, pp. 264,270. 
other words, this movement was not against foreign capital because of the term 
"dependent development". In the 1930s and 1940s In Brazil and Mexico many big 
enterprises were founded or were already in existence. Latin American economic 
development in the twentieth century has taken place with the autonomy of the state 
largely restricted by the presence of an already strong industrial business class133. In 
Turkey, a local business class was virtually nonexistent in the early years of the 
Republican period and foreign capital does not appear as a factor likely to limit state 
autonomy and to affect the political content of business activity. Thus the relationship 
between a Latin American government and a MNC seeking to establish operations in 
that country depends largely on the existing ties between that government and local 
firms or other MNCs with existing facihties. Unless the MNC offers some superior 
benefits to the government in comparison with the established local firms, it is likely 
be quite difficult for the new MNC to enter that market.'34 
These explanations show that the states in Brazil and Mexico have 
connections with the local entxepreneurs and MNCs. However, only these facts do not 
explain the governments' success. Many governments were mostly successful in 
bargaining with the foreign firms in certain areas. Then the question is what the other 
facts were increasing the bargaining power of the host countries. 
First of all, the bargaining process is somewhat hke a game theory with two 
players. Thus, both participants have the chance to win. Therefore, it should be stated 
that host countries governments do not win all the time. Then, it becomes necessary to 
examine under whch condtions the actors, the MNCs and the governments, have the 
bargaining power over the other. First, the power of the firm is greater in situations in 
133 Bugra, p.20. 
134 Grosse, p.7 1. 
which its proprietary knowledge in pharmaceuticals, computers, is more important. 
For instance, in Brazil, the state couldn't succeed in increasing the share of the local 
content in the pharmaceuticals sector because of the technological advantage of 
foreign h s . ' "  On the other hand, if the technology in the project is mature or 
standardized such as in foods, then the f m  has less bargaining power than the 
government. 
Second, the governments welcome the research and development 
expendtures of MNCs in the host countries and the MNCs enjoy some exceptions. 
Third, MNCs have bargaining power in locations where economies of scale 
are important. On the other hand, the governments of the host countries mostly have 
bargaining power in circumstances where the industry is based on a raw material 
available in the host country. In other words, the more dependent the MNC is on 
some resources of the country, the more powerful the government's bargaining 
position. For instance, Venezuela was able to nationalize and control the ownership of 
the oil reserves in 1975 due to this explanation.'36 
In addition, the power of the government increases where the market served 
by the business is entirely in the host country. Access to the domestic market 
strengthens the bargaining power of the host countries. Finally, the bargaining power 
of a host country increases in hlghly competitive industries. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the position of the state and its role in 
generating basic industry, a favorable economic environment, and access to the 
domestic markets strengthens the bargaining power of a host country. 
135 Evans, pp. 84-90. 
136 Grosse, p.82. 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, frrst, the question of why a firm invests abroad was 
investigated by examining economic and business theories of FDI. A general survey of 
FDI theories demonstrated that there is no single theory explaining the motive of FDI. 
Most of the theories explaining FDI were case studies and their arguments were 
inadequate to explain FDI activities in other specific cases. 
Second, in this thesis, the relationship between FDI activities and the 
international economic conjuncture was examined. The flow of FDI took place mostly 
between developed countries in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In 
addition, the share of late developing countries in FDI activities continued to diminish 
whlle the share of developing countries increased during the twentieth century. The 
distribution of FDI as well was related to the international conjuncture. In the 
nineteenth century most of the foreign firms were concentrated in export-oriented 
sectors in late developing countries. This was strongly related with the economic 
conjuncture. In the nineteenth century most of the LDCs were colonials of the center 
countries and the importance of raw materials in the nineteenth century increased the 
FDI activities in export orientation and the service, infrastructure sectors in these 
countries. In the twentieth century foreign firms mostly were concentrated in the 
manufacturing sectors in these countries. After the Second World War, many of LDCs 
adopted IS1 strategy that led to an increase in tariff rates and foreign firms decided to 
invest rather than export to these countries. Foreign firms enjoyed hlgh rates of profit 
in protected manufacturing industries in which local competition was weak. One of the 
reasons for the flow of FDI into LDCs was the demands of the governments of these 
countries to reahe high rates of economic growth. Inadequate capital stock led the 
LDCs to use FDI as an external resource in the quest for economic development and 
economic growth. 
In Chapter 6 the FDI in Turkey was analyzed. In reality, the contribution of 
FDI was insignificant or, in other words, it was below the expected level. The share of 
FDI in the GNP fluctuated between one and two percent, which refers to an 
unimportant contribution. The employment effect and the contribution to the tax 
revenues of the state of FDI in Turkey were also insipficant. However, this master 
thesis suggests that although the contribution of FDI to the Turkish economy was 
statistically insignificant, it played an important role in the transformation of merchants 
into the industrial bourgeoisie. The increase in tariff rates led merchants to 
manufacture the products whlch they had imported before and the lack of 
technological and managerial knowledge led them to collaborate with forelgn firms. 
Most of the well-known industrial groups today collaborated with foreign frrms in the 
1950s and 1960s. 
Finally, the reasons for the inadequate inflow of FDI were examined. Actually, 
there is not a single fact explaining the reasons of inadequate inflow of FDI. However, 
there are some facts that explain maybe not wholly, but mostly, the inadequate inflow 
of FDI in Turkey. The facts: the foreign exchange problem, economic and political 
instabihty, the lack of a strong and single department dealing with FDI, red-tape, the 
attitude of the SPO toward the foreign firms together are reasonable in understanding 
the inadequacy of FDI into Turkey. In addtion, this thesis suggests that the Turkish 
government's bargaining policies, hke those of the governments of Latin American in 
the 1970s, also hindered the inflow of FDI. First, the demands of the Turkish 
government mostly were irrational. Most of the foreign f m s  complained that meeting 
the demands of the Turkish government was impossible. 
In conclusion, LDCs, in the second half of the twentieth century, aimed to 
sustain hgher economic growth rates. They adopted industrialization as the main 
target. Turkey, named as one of the LDCs, to realize higher growth rates encouraged 
the inflow of FDI as an external source into the country. It was because, the capital 
was scarce or, in other words, internal sources were inadequate for the rapid 
industrialization in the country and there was a need of external source to sustain 
higher economic growth rates. However, the inflow of FDI I d  not reach to the level 
that was expected. The number of f m s  containing foreign capital was insignificant 
when compared with Brazil and Mexico. The contribution of FDI to economic 
growth, employment, and tax revenue of the state was insipficant also. This thesis 
also suggested some certain facts in explaining the reasons of inadequate flow of FDI 
into Turkey. This is because, there is not a single fact explaining the inadequate flow of 
FDI. The investment climate, the role of bureaucracy, the government attitudes 
towards foreign firms and the international economic conjuncture, together make 
sense in understandmg the reasons of inadequate flow of FDI. 
Today, there is a great interest of the public towards the FDI issue. This is an 
important development when the excitably discussions about the FDI issue in the 
parliament and public in the 1960s are considered. Law No. 6224, encouraging FDI, is 
still remaining in effect- with minor but important changes and the red-tape is by and 
large reduced. However, although the members of the parliament wholly are aware of 
the contribution of FDI and encourage the inflow of FDI, the political and economic 
instabhty obstruct the higher amounts of inflow of FDI. Therefore it can be said that, 
liberal foreign encouragement law is not enough to increase the inflow of FDI, it 
should be accompanied by the economic and political stability. 
Law No. 6224 
APPENDIX 
A. FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENCOURAGEMENT LAW 
Approved on January 18,1954 
Subject of the Law 
Article 1. This law shall apply to the foreign capital imported into Turkey and to loans 
made from abroad by the decision of the Foreign Encouragement Committee and the 
approval of the Council of Ministers provided that the enterprise in which the investment shall 
be made: 
a) wdl tend to promote the economic development of the country, 
b) will operate in a field of activity open to Turkish private enterprises, 
c) wdl e n t d  no monopoly or a special privilege. 
"The Foreign Investment Encouragement Committee" referred to in this Article and 
established accordmg to Article 8, wdl herinafter be referred to as "The Committee". 
Foreign Capital Base 
Article 2. For the purpose of the application of this Law, the term "Foreign Capital 
Base" shall mean the sum of the values assessed and fured in the manner described here- 
under: 
a) The following items imported from abroad for the efficient establishment, 
expension or reactivation of an enterprise as envisaged by this Law: 
1- Capital in the form of foreign exchange 
2- Machinery, equipment, instnunents and the like, machinery components, spare 
parts and materials and other necessary goods approved by the Committee, 
3- Intangible nghts such as licenses, patent rights and trade marks and services. 
a) The experts selected by the Committee will assess the value of the imported 
capital in the form of goods, services and intangible llghts and d determine 
whether these are goods and values imported for the purpose of the enterprise 
approved by the Committee. 
The assessments made by the experts may be reviewed and modified by the 
Committee. 
The assessment shall be made both in the currency of the country of origm and in 
Turkish currency at the official rate of exchange prevaihng at the time of importation. 
The right to appeal provided for in Article 8 being reserved, the decision of the 
Committee with respect to assessment shall be final. 
Reinvestment of Profits 
Article 3. Of the profits realized by an approved enterprise under the tax laws in 
force, the net amount accrued to the owners of the Foreign capital base may be, by the 
decision of the Committee, reinvested and added, in whole or in part, to the basic foreign 
capital or invested in some other enterprise meeting the conditions of Article 1. 
Transfer of Profits and Capital Stock 
Article 4. 
a> The following profits and capital stocks are entitled, subject to the provisions 
of paragraph (c) of this Article, to transfer abroad in the currency of the 
country from which the foreign capital base origmated and at the prevahng 
official rate of exchange. 
Of the profits realized after December 31, 1953, as determined by the tax 
laws in force, such net amounts as accrue to the owners of the foreign capital 
base. 
The share of the owners of the foreign capital base in the proceeds of the 
sale, within reasonable prices, of assets in case of partial or total liquidation of 
an enterprise subject to this Law. 
The proceeds of the sale, within reasonable prices, of part or the whole of the 
foreign capital base of an enterprise subject to this Law. 
The principle of and interest on a foreign loan contracted accordtng to the 
provisions of Article 6 of this Law, when due under the terms of the Loan 
Agreement. 
The Ministry of Finance or the Committee, may, if they deem it necessary, 
order 
the inspection of the books of account and tax returns of the 
enterprise subject to this Law, in order to determine the amount transferable 
in accordance with sub-paragraph 1 of Paragraph (a) of this Article, or 
Investigation of the bona fide nature of sales shares and assets 
and of loans to an approved enterprise. 
The Ivhnistry of Finance shall issue, upon application the requisite permit for 
the transfer abroad of profits, sales proceeds or the principal of and interest 
on loans that are eligible for transfer under paragraph (a) of this Article. 
Transfer of Shares 
Article 5 
a) The Ministry of Finance shall execute, upon request, the following guarantees upon 
stock shares or stock certificates, registered on the books of the Turhsh corporation, 
that represent the foreign capital base, as defined in Article 2. 
( The dividends of this stock share are imrnedately transferable into ... (Foreign 
exchanges of origins) at the official rate of exchange prevailing at the date of transfer, 
on presentation of this stock share of stock certificate to the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey or its authorized representatives abroad. The proceeds of the sale 
of tbs  stock share or stock certificate or that part of the proceeds of the realized value 
of the assets sold in liquidation, to which the owner of this stock share or stock 
certificate is entitled, are transferable at the official rate of exchange prevailing at the 
date of transfer, into.. . (Foreign exchange or orign) in accordance with article 4 of 
Law No.:. . . of the Republic of Turkey.) 
b) Registered stock shares or stock certificates bearing such guarantees shall be freely 
transferable between persons of all nationalities both in Turkey and abroad. Before 
the sale of such stock shares or stock certificates to real and juridical persons settled in 
Turkey, it is obligatory to present them to the Mmistry of Finance for the cancellation 
of such guarantees whether or not new stock shares or stock certificates are issued to 
replace them. 
Guaranty of Loans 
Article 6 
a) The Ministry of Finance is authorized, subject to a decision of the Council of 
Ministers, to provide its guaranty, against security or bail, for an amount not exceeding 
1 bilhon Turkish h a s ,  of the principal of and interest on a foreign loan to an 
enterprise h l f h g  the requirements of Article 1 of this Law. 
b) Such guaranty shall automatically lapse with respect to any part of the principal or 
interest of a loan so guaranteed that has been repaired. 
Employment of Aliens 
Article 7 
a) The condtions and prohibitions of Laws Nos. 2007 and 2818 shall not apply, 
during the periods of surveying, erection and operation of an enterprise 
established in accordance with this Law to aliens investing in such enterprises, 
to alien representatives of such investors and to alien experts, foremen and 
other s u e d  personnel for such period of time as the Committee certificate is 
necessary to the efficient establishment, expansion, reactivation or operation of 
such enterprises. 
b) The above provisions, shall also apply to alien experts, foremen and other 
s u e d  personnel employed by such domestic enterprises as do, in the opinion 
of the Committee, meet the conditions set forth in Article 1 of this Law. 
c) Aliens employed accordmg to the provisions of this article may, subject to the 
prior consent of the Mnistry of Finance, transfer in the currency of their own 
respective countries and at the prevailing official exchange rates, that part of 
their earnings as are stipulated in their respective contract of employment, for 
the maintenance of their dependents and for their normal savings. 
Foreign Investment Encouragement Committee 
Article 8 
a) In order to carry out the duties provided for by this Law, a committee is formed 
under the chairmanship of the General Manager of the Central Bank of the 
Turkish Republic and consisting of the following members: the Director General 
of the Treasury, the Director General of Domestic Trade, the Director General of 
Industrial Affairs, the Chairman of the Board of Research and Planning of the 
Mmistry of State Enterprises and the Secretary General of the Union of Chambers 
of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchanges. In cases where it finds it 
necessary, this Committee may ask for the opinion, on an advisory basis, of 
representatives of other Ministries and institutions. The Committee shall gve its 
decision on any application, within 15 days, at the latest of their submittals. 
The Director General of Domestic Trade wdl act as Secretary General of the 
Committee. If necessary, the Committee may be called to a meeting by the 
Secretary General. 
The remuneration to be paid to the Chairmen and members of the 
Committee d be fixed by the Council of Ministers. 
b) Any decision of the Committee may be appealed by the parties concerned within 
30 days as from the date of the notification thereof. The competent authority to 
deal with such appeals in constituted by the Ministers of Finance, Economy and 
Commerce and State Enterprises. The decisions of this authority are final. 
Article 9 
a) The Ministry of Economy and Commerce is the competent authority in the 
application of the provisions of this law. 
b) The Ministry of Economy and Commerce shall have the authority to order release 
from the custody of the customs of foreign capital imported in kind according to 
the decisions of the Committee. 
Equal Treatment of Domestic and Foreign Capital 
Article 10 all rights, immunities and facilities granted to domestic capital and 
enterprises shall be available on equal terms, to foreign capital and enterprises shall be 
available on equal terms, to foreign capital and enterprises engaged in the same fields. 
Article 11 
a) All rights granted to the investors under Article 31 of Decree No. 13 issued under 
authority of Law No. 1567 and under Laws Nos. 5533 and 5821 are hereby 
preserved. 
b) Investments made under Law No. 5821 between Augustlst, 1951 and the date on 
whch this Laws enters into force, shall benefit from the provisions of this Law. 
Repeal of Former Law 
Article 12 Law No. 5821 is hereby repealed. 
Effective Date 
Article 13 This Law shall be effective from the date of its promulgation. 
Article 14 The Council of Ministers is charged with the enforcement of this Law. 
Explanatory Notes 
1) The purpot of the Laws referred to in the foregoing Law No. 6224 is as follows: 
A- Law No. 2007 concerns the trades and employments reserved to Turkish citizens 
in Turkey. 
B- Law No. 2818 provides that persons employed in any mines must be Turkish 
citizens, although engineers, technicians, foremen and skilled workers may be of 
foreign nationalities; that an employment permit must be obtained, however on 
behalf of such foreign labor from the relevant Ministry; and that the employers 
are required, for every alien person employed, to pay a so-called "expert training 
contribution" at a rate to be fixed by the Government. 
2) Due to changes in the organization of the Turkish Government, subsequent to 
the promulgation of the Law, the Ministry of Economy and Commerce referred 
to in the Law has been succeeded by the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry 
of State Enterprises by the Ministry of Industry. 
3) Again due to the afore-mentioned changes, the Committee referred to under 
Article 8 hereof is currently composed of the following members: 
General Manager of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 
Chairman of the Committee, 
President of the Department of Domestic Trade, Wnistry of Commerce, 
Secretary - General of the Committee, 
Director General of Treasury, Ministry of Finance, 
President of the Department of Industry, MLtllstry of Industry, 
President of the Department of Power, Ministry of Industry, 
President of the Department of Mming, Ministry of Industry, 
Secretary General of the Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and 
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey. 
Source: Oksay (1 967) 
B. Tables 
Table A1 Degree of Investment Risk in Turkey Compared with Other Countries 
Evaluated by 20 U.S. Companies, 1972 
Country Greater Same Less Do Not Know 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Israel 
Greece 
Iran 
India 
E ~ Y P ~  
England 
France 
Japan 
Source: Ashkin, p. 123. 
Table A 2 Relative Importance of Amount of FDI Entered 
in Several Ways by the End of 1965 ($ 1000) 
by the law no.5821-6224 68,6 18 
by Industrial Development Bank 64,480 
by Petroleum Law 236,226 
by Special Law No.7462 about Eregli 
Iron and Steel factory 163,812 
TOTAl $533,136 
Source: Tuncer, p.79. 
Table A 3 Distribution of American Investment Abroad with Respect to Industries 
(1 960- 1965) -as percentage 
Industries 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Petroleum 56.3 50.7 48.8 48.0 43.7 40.2 
Manufacturing 26.8 31.9 32.8 33.6 38.0 37.1 
Mining 9.8 9.5 11.1 10.9 10.1 14.3 
Trade 3.8 4.4 4.1 4.3 3.7 3.8 
Others 3.3 3.5 3.2 3.2 4.5 4.6 
Source: Tuncer, p.39. 
Table A 4 Transfers of Firms Containing Foreign Capital in Turkey (According to Law 
No.6224) (Thousand dollars) 
Profit Credit and Interest License TOTAL 
TOTAL 
Source: Uras, p.225. 
Table A 5 Authorized and Realized FDI 1950- 1 974 ( $ 1,000) 
Year foreign material intangible total foreign material intangible total 
exchange capital rights exchange capital rights 
Source: $ahin, p.67; Uras, pp. 162, 169. 
Table A 6 Distribution of Imports in Turkey ($ millions) 
1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 
Investment Goods 245 34 1 367 446 782.7 
Raw Materials 226 34 1 361 455 707.1 
Consumer Goods 26 36 36 47 72.8 
Source: Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Bqbakanlik Basm-Yaym Gene1 Miidiirlligii, p. 393 
Table A 7 Distribution of FDI According to Country of Origin by 1977 
Countries Number of Firms % of Total Foreign Capital 
West Germany 
U.S.A. 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Netherlands 
Britain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Italy 
Japan 
Canada 
Kuwait 
Mixed 
TOTAL 99 100.00 
Source, Uras, p. 153. 
Table A8 Comparison of Transferable Income and Transferred Income, 1973 (according to 
Law No.6224) 
Transferable (1) Transferred (2) (2) 1 (1) 
Final Goods Sector 3.197 2.794 87.3 
Intermediary Goods Sector 5.895 3.565 60.4 
Investment Goods Sector 7.1 10 4.906 69.0 
TOTAL 16.202 1 1.265 69.5 
Source: Own calculation from Alpar, p. 175. 
Table A9 Wages Paid Monthly by Foreign Firms Local Firms (TL-1973) 
Final Goods Sector 2,875 1,69 1 
Intermediary Goods Sector 2,892 2,131 
Investment Goods Sector 2,833 1,895 
Average 2,833 1,905 
Source: Alpar, p. 184. 
Table A10 Organization of Foreign Business in Turkey and Their Share in the Joint Venture (end of 
1965 1,000 TL) 
Nature of No Local YO Foreign % Joint YO 
Organization Capital Capital Capital 
Corporation 72 284,705 46.1 332,749 53.9 617,454 100 
Limited Company 26 16,958 19.2 71,327 80.8 88,285 100 
Others 6 6,393 60.8 4,123 39.2 10,516 100 
TOTAL 104 308,056 43.0 408,199 57.0 716,255 100 
Source: Reports on FDI, Special Comission of Experts, in Tuncer, p.90, in Ashkin p.79. 
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